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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ARMED FORCES

DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ALTUNIN PRAISES WAR HEROES ON VICTORY DAY

Baku VYSHKA in Russian 9 May 83 pp 1,3

[Article by A. T. Altunin, deputy USSR minister of defense and Hero of the Soviet Union: "An Unfading Feat"]

[Text] Happy Victory Day!

The date 9 May 1945 is a bright, unforgettable page in the heroic annals of our socialist native land. On that nationwide day of celebration, Moscow saluted in honor of the valorous USSR Armed Forces and the victorious Soviet people, after announcing to the world the end of the war and the long-awaited victory over the German Fascist aggressors.

Victory Day is a holiday which is infinitely dear to the Soviet people. With warmth and gratitude we pay homage of deep respect for the courage and selflessness of those who fought gallantly and boldly, who poured out their blood and gave up life for the motherland's freedom and happiness, and for those who heroically labored in the rear services.

This year the holiday of Victory in our country is marked by an atmosphere of high political and labor enthusiasm that was stimulated by the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum decisions. Consequently, the program for further increasing the workers' welfare and for strengthening the country's economic and defensive might are being implemented.

The war that German Fascism imposed on us was the hugest military collision of socialism and the shock forces of imperialism, the most difficult and cruel of all tests ever experienced by our country. It became the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people for the freedom and independence of the socialist motherland.

Especially severe tests had to be experienced at the start of the war, when the immense previously mobilized army of Hitlerites and their satellites, intoxicated with the venom of chauvinism and racism, forced their way deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. We veterans of the war remember this difficult time. Each of those who themselves experienced the calamities of the first months of the war, who saw the blood and death of their comrades by weapons, left our cities and villages with an ache in the heart and lived

constantly with firm faith in that bright hour when the Soviet people and its army would gather their forces, stop the invasion by the Fascist plague and turn the enemy back.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party the country was transformed into a united military battle camp. The Soviet people lived by the motto, "Everything for the front, everything for victory!"

In difficult defensive battles, the Red Army wore down the enemy's best regular divisions. The feat of the defenders of the Brest fortress was a symbol of unshakeable faithfulness to the soldier's duty. The Smolensk battle, where the Soviet guard was born, will always remain in the people's memory. During these and other engagements in the summer and fall of 1941, the enemy's illusions of easy victories were scattered in the dust. The heroic defenses of Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol and the Soviet Arctic upset the Fascist high command's strategic schemes.

The Hitlerite horde suffered its first major defeat in World War II in December 1941, at Moscow. It was here that the Fascist plan for a "blitzkrieg" war was finally interrupted and the myth of the German Army's invincibility was dispelled. Our victory at Moscow signified the start of a radical turn in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

The outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad had enormous military and political significance. The USSR presented to the planet's workers this force which was capable of defending its freedom and independence and, at the same time, of accomplishing a great historical mission--to liberate the peoples of Europe from Fascism. The victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad laid the beginning of a radical break not only in the Great Patriotic War but also in the whole of World War II.

In 2 months the Soviet people will mark the 40th anniversary of the start of the Kursk battle, where the Soviet Armed forces inflicted on the German Fascist army a defeat from which it could not recover until the very end of the war. The Hitlerite high command was forced to dispense with offensive operations and transfer to the defense over the whole Soviet-German front. Soviet troops completely and finally grabbed the strategic initiative.

After the crushing route at Stalingrad and at the Kursk salient, the Fascist army proved to be facing catastrophe. The large-scale expulsion of the enemy from Soviet territory began. Our forces chased the enemy westward and in 1944 liberated the native land from the aggressors.

The combat actions at the concluding stage of the war, when the Soviet Army, in carrying out its liberating mission, made a decisive contribution to the deliverance of many peoples from the Fascist yoke and to the final victory over the Fascist coalition, are a bright page in the heroic annals of the motherland.

The tense struggle of almost 4 years was completed by the Berlin strategic offensive operation. Here, in the prostrate capital of the Third Reich, the

enemy was finished off and capitulated unconditionally. Soviet soldiers hoisted the banner of victory over the Reichstag.

Victory in World War II was achieved by the joint efforts of the peoples and the armies of the anti-Hitlerite coalition of all the peoples who actively struggled against the German Fascist aggressors and their allies. However, the main contribution to the aggressor's crushing defeat was made by the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces. For the duration of the whole war the Soviet-German front tied down the main part of Hitlerite Germany's forces and resources. It was here that 607 enemy divisions were routed and the major portion of its aviation, artillery and tanks were destroyed.

The victory in the Great Patriotic War showed convincingly that the sources of the Soviet people's force and might were laid in a socialist society and state system, in its indisputable advantage over the capitalist order, and in our socialist ideology. The inviolable union of workers and peasants and the great friendship of the peoples of the USSR were most important sources of the victory.

The invincible might of the USSR Armed Forces and the supremacy of Soviet military art insured victory in the Great Patriotic War. Fighters of the army and navy showed limitless dedication to their motherland, to the people and to the Communist Party, and they showed the greatest heroism and the highest military mastery.

The Communist Party--the leading and guiding force of Soviet society--was the inspiration and organizer of the victory of the Soviet people and its army. Under exceptionally difficult conditions it managed to provide for the restructuring of the country's whole life into military harmony, to mobilize the Soviet people to the sacred struggle against the Fascist aggressors, and to achieve complete victory over the Fascists of Germany.

The course of international events in recent times indicates that imperialism, primarily American, disregarding history's lessons, has not dropped its hegemonistic intentions, its reliance on military power. Militant circles of the USA and NATO, hiding behind the smokescreen of the nonsensical myth of the "Soviet military threat," have undertaken the policy of changing the approximately equal ratio of military strategic forces in the world arena in its favor. In the name of achieving these purposes they have promoted an arms race of unprecedented scale. The military and political leadership of the United States and of NATO is striving to create in possible theaters of military actions powerful groupings of armed forces that are capable of inflicting strikes over a great depth, including strikes made with strategic weaponry.

Washington's intention to execute the decision it has imposed on NATO countries about deploying in some West European states new American missile weaponry of medium range, which are, in regard to the USSR, actually a strategic weapon, causes special concern. Realizing this plan will be a serious danger to the peoples of Europe, and it undoubtedly will lead to a still greater deterioration of the international situation.

"...The current administration of the USA continues to proceed along an extremely dangerous path," noted Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, answering a PRAVDA correspondent's questions. "One cannot dismiss such questions of war and peace so light-heartedly. All attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR will be in vain. The Soviet Union will never permit this, it will never let itself be disarmed in the face of any threat."

The USSR Armed Forces' equipment now includes the most modern means of struggle against an aggressor. The army and navy have at their disposal mighty complexes of strategic missiles of intercontinental and medium range; the newest types of tanks and self-propelled and other kinds of artillery; effective means for air defense capable of successfully waging a struggle against all existing or prospective means of enemy air attack; modern aircraft with high combat and flight characteristics; and new nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers and missile and ASW ships.

The Soviet people can be assured that our valorous Armed Forces, closely united around the Leninist Communist Party, will now and henceforth, in combat collaboration with the armies of the fraternal socialist countries, carry out worthily their patriotic and international duty and vigilantly stand guard over socialism's achievements. They are ready to give any aggressor a crushing rebuff!

11409

CSO: 1801/332

ARMED FORCES

LITHUANIAN MILITARY COMMISSARIAT ON OFFICER REQUIREMENTS

Vilnius TIESA [TRUTH] in Lithuanian 29 May 83 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Konstantinas Gaurylius: "Officer's Noble Profession--Soldier's Duty Is a Patriotic Duty"]

[Text] TIESA editors receive a number of letters from the readers asking to tell them about the Soviet army officers, to advise how to become an officer, and to provide information about the country's higher military schools and the admission requirements

These matters are explained by the chief of the Republic's Military Commissariat Political Department Maj Gen Konstantinas Gaurylius.

Many young men want to become officers of the armed forces. To be a Soviet officer is a noble profession. No one is a born officer but he can become one, according to his capacity, if he has a high school diploma and is able and determined to pursue his life's goal.

Many glorious pages were written in the annals of our country's history by the Soviet military leaders. Jeronimas Uborevicius, Vytautas Putna and Jokubas Smuskevicius, among others, are always remembered with respect. I knew Jonas Ziburkus personally. Unusually dedicated to the Communist party, morally pure and determined, this serviceman went all the way from a private to an artillery Major General.

Maj Gen Jonas Macijauskas of Obele actively participated in the Great October Revolution. After returning to Lithuania in 1918, he fought for the Soviet government in the Rokiskis district, and in 1921 he was in command of a Soviet army squadron. In 1940, he became chief political leader of Lithuania's peoples army, and at the time of the Great Patriotic War--Commissar of Lithuanian units and chief of the political section.

Gen Adolfas Urbsas, Leontijus Gurtjevas and Michailas Jensinas developed from Panevezys high school students. Under the leadership of M. Jensinas, Hero of the Soviet Union and bearer of two orders of Lenin, the military units were crushing the enemy in Zapolyarnyy, near Leningrad, and in the Kursk salient;

crossed the Neman river, liberated Mariampole and Virbalis, and fought at the Vistula and Oder rivers. He marched with honors in the ranks of Soviet army--from a private to lieutenant general.

With Lt Gen Vincas Vitkauskas, Maj Gens Feliksas Baltusis-Zemaitis, Vladas Karvelis, Pranas Petronis, Ceslovas Perkauskas, Vladislovas Mickevicius, Petras Turla, Steponas Nekrosius, and Rokas Zalnierauskas--nearly 30 Soviet generals came from the small country of Lithuania.

Fine officers and leaders, graduates of the country's higher military schools, serve in the Soviet armed forces. Among them, Cols Antanas Pakalka and Pranas Dragunaitis of Sakiai rayon; Col Genutis Taurinskas, Maj Antanas Niuniavas of Mazeikiai rayon; Lt Col Sigitas Raubickas of Siauliai; two brothers Captains Vladimiras and Michailas Grybe; Col Algis Jucevicius of Pasvalis; Maj of Medical Services Vygandas Rumsas of Silute; 3rd rank Captain Engineer Algimantas Zubauskas of Kedainiai; and many other officers.

Higher military schools are the molds where the officers are formed. They admit those young men who pass competitive high school program examinations which include written examinations in Russian language and literature, oral and written in mathematics, and oral in physics. Those entering political military schools have to pass oral examinations in USSR history, written examinations in Russian language and literature, and oral in mathematics.

High school graduates who want to become political workers should be advised to enter Lvov, Leningrad, Kiev or Simferopol higher military schools. General army schools are waiting for high school graduates in Moscow, Kiev and Alma Ata; tank and tank engineering schools in Kharkov; artillery school(s) in Leningrad; military engineering schools in Kaliningrad and Saratov; communications schools in Kiev and Stavropol; air defense schools in Vilnius and Minsk; air force schools in Kachinsk and Kharkov; aviation engineering schools in Kiev and Riga; navy schools in Leningrad and Kaliningrad; paratroop and motorized vehicles schools in Ryazan; and army engineering--in Leningrad. There are also many other military schools. Any young man can find out about them at the military commissariats, which they should contact first of all. The military commissariats will then provide the necessary information and advise accordingly. To their best members who want to join the military schools the Komsomol organizations provide Komsomol passes, which are very important to have.

The military schools are waiting for the young men. They can become pilots or sailors, political workers or engineers, architects or civil engineers, which represent quite a number of military occupations. However, even in peaceful times they demand more effort and endurance than the civilian professions.

The graduates of these schools receive a military lieutenant or engineering lieutenant degree; a military education diploma and a higher education diploma of the Union standard where a related civilian specialization is indicated. Mechanical engineers, aviation engineers, and others are included in this category.

The names of the best officers are put on an honor roll. So, for example, on the honor roll of Vilnius Higher Air Defense Radio Electronics Officers School we can read the names of V. Gudaitis, L. Boskutis, L. Lekavicius, A. Mickevicius and L. Rukas; on the Leningrad Order of Lenin and Order of Red Banner artillery commanders marble honor rolls--the names of A. Gaizutis and L. Maurutis, and B. Zilinskas, V. Mesuris and V. Piragius.

In recent days I visited one of the military schools. The life of cadets there is full of unusual tension. The future officers must first of all experience what all ordinary soldiers experience, and only then they start learning the art of officer's professional alphabet and begin practical training in the military units. There they are tested; with the sound of an alarm they have to mount a training attack, take part in exhausting marches, parachute jumping, and sweeping the mine fields.... They keep watch, shoot from automatic weapons, machine guns and artillery, and learn to drive tanks and to guide rockets. They have some anxious and sleepless nights, but they learn how to endure, how to be alert and persistent, and they always feel proud of realizing that they will become trusted defenders of their homeland.

I have often been asked what was my own road, as a military, to the Major General's rank.

From 1942, when I first put on my soldier's uniform, there was a great deal to see and to learn. I lived through the war storms, experienced bitter and painful losses, and joys of victory. And all my life up to these days I had to work hard and to study. I should like to remind every young man who chooses the noble officer's profession that an officer must like his job. And he can like it only when it gives him a moral satisfaction, when his heart tells him that the people and his homeland need his services.

The art of war is full of grim and strict romanticism. It calls for great responsibility to your country; a responsibility for the borders which a Soviet Army officer has to defend; a responsibility for the soldiers he leads; and a responsibility for the complex war technology.

An officer serves not where he wants but where he is needed. He has always, at any time, to be ready to hear a danger signal. Only very strong people can be Soviet army officers; the way to the army is closed for those who are weak.

I happened to read a tank soldier's letter to his mother. "If some day the enemy should start a new world war," he wrote, "it would have to be fought on a wide scale. I know, however, that our planet Earth still bears the wounds of the past war catastrophies, that mothers still walk shrouded in black veils, and that the people of good will should be able to remove the dangers. I do believe it, and I also know that the disasters are equally painful to all people throughout the world. We, the future tankmen, are learning not to burn and to destroy, but to defend the life and to protect it. I am ready for it every day and every hour--any minute!"

This is the way a patriot of his homeland speaks.

In passing the officer's baton to the cadets, as a veteran soldier I would like to advise them: love your country and show respect to man and work. Be just!

9932

CSO: 1809/16

ARMED FORCES

ROLE VOIR ORGANIZATIONS PLAY IN DEVELOPING MILITARY TRAINING EQUIPMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 83 p 2

[Article by Engr Maj Gen A. Safronov, Chief of the Department of Inventions Development, USSR Ministry of Defense: "The Innovators' Weighty Contribution"]

[Text] On 25 May the 6th Congress of the All-Union Society of Inventors and Efficiency Experts [VOIR] begins its work in Moscow. Representatives of the Armed Forces will also be delegates.

The party views the progress of science and technology, the introduction of their latest achievements into production, and the development of the mass creativity of scientists and efficiency experts as a matter for the entire state and all the people. The innovators respond to this concern with practical accomplishments — creation of new, original and highly efficient inventions and improvements and active participation in their practical implementation, and in so doing make a worthy contribution to fulfilling economic plans and creating the material-technical base of communism.

Year after year the ranks of innovators multiply and they increase their contribution to accelerating scientific and technical progress, improving equipment and technology, increasing labor productivity, and economizing material and fuel and energy resources. In the past five-year plan alone, the economic effect of using inventions and improvements in the country's economy totaled more than 29 billion rubles, and in two years of the 11th Five-Year Plan approximately 14 billion rubles have been saved. Whereas in 1978 roughly 55,000 inventions were entered in the USSR State Register, in 1982 there were more than 91,000. During the years since the 5th VOIR Congress, the number of members of this society rose from 9.6 million to almost 13 million.

Innovators from the Soviet Armed Forces go to the congress with great achievements. During recent years, the number of inventors and efficiency experts in the army and navy has risen significantly, as have the number of inventions and improvements introduced and patents obtained, and the timeliness, effectiveness and scale of creative efforts have increased. Their use is having a substantial influence on increasing the combat readiness of units and ships and improving personnel training.

The introduction into troop units of new equipment proposed by the innovators has reduced the time required to ready weapons and military equipment for

combat use, mechanized many labor intensive operations, provided faster and better quality equipment maintenance and repair, and economized significant material and labor resources. Last year alone, tens of millions of rubles were saved at cost accounting repair enterprises and in Ministry of Defense organizations as a result of innovations.

On the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology, army and navy inventors and efficiency experts have developed many models of training equipment, integrated trainers, simulators, training apparatuses and training aids, and thus made a major contribution to improving the training material-technical base, especially that portion designed for assimilating new models of weapons and military equipment.

Considerable credit in all this is due to the VOIR organizations and the soviets which they head that have been created in many military units and ships, and in the overwhelming majority of military training institutions, repair enterprises, construction organizations and scientific research institutes. These organizations have become much more active recently, and they have increased in number and membership. For example, in the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District there are now 16,000 VOIR members, in the Red Banner Turkestan Military District more than 13,000, and in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet 21,000.

These soviets, in close contact with the commissions on inventions, carry out considerable work in involving Soviet Army and Navy servicemen, workers and employees in technical creativity. They organize inspections of invention and innovation efforts and thematic competitions, assist innovators in developing their proposals and registering their improvement claims and invention applications, supervise the timely use of proposals, and organize the training of patent officials and the study and introduction into practice of scientific and technological achievements.

Thus in the repair enterprise where Engr Col A. Zaslavskiy is chairman of the Inventions Committee and Engr Capt A. Saponenko is chairman of the VOIR soviet, many valuable proposals have been introduced for improving repair methods and increasing combat equipment working life, as well as for more rapid and better maintenance in the field. At the initiative of many VOIR soviets, the study of scientific and technical achievements and advanced experience is being organized, with aim of introducing them into military practice.

Many army and navy VOIR soviets maintain close ties with republic, kray, oblast and city soviets, and obtain great help from them. Thus, in the unit in which Col V. Kolesnikov heads the Inventions Committee and Maj A. Postnikov the VOIR soviet, lecturers from the republic VOIR soviet systematically conduct discussions with unit personnel. Dozens of officers and warrant officers are attending the republic public institute for patent processors.

With the assistance of VOIR soviets, many military training institutions have well organized training on invention and patent work. In particular, purposeful work on patent processing is being conducted among the employees at the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. They teach the basics of this

important subject to many students of the Stavropol Higher Military Engineering School of Communications imeni 60th Anniversary of the Great October. Last year alone, students, either independently or in co-authorship with teachers submitted 140 invention applications.

Army-wide measures are being carried out jointly with the Central VOIR Soviet. These include, for example, an inspection-competition conducted under the motto, "For Massive and Highly Efficient Scientific Creativity", the first stage of which is being completed this year; a thematic materiel competition for an alternative to plywood for constructing targets; and others.

The Central VOIR Soviet highly values the contribution of military inventors and efficiency experts. Annually the creative work of a large group of innovators is recognized with emblems for "Excellence in Inventions and Innovations" and monetary prizes, many military collectives are awarded certificates, and the best military educational institution cadet and student design bureaus are provided incentive awards.

However, the successes of army and navy innovators could be much more substantial. Instances are still common in which valuable inventions gather dust in units because individual leaders want to spare themselves from "unnecessary" work which accompanies the introduction of something new. Not always is the innovator's search directed at solving the most urgent problems.

Army and navy innovators direct their efforts at achieving high indices in socialist competition, and at fulfilling the requirement of the times: new equipment, and a higher level of its mastery. Their daily slogan is to untiringly increase the effectiveness of combat training, and to strengthen with their labor the defense might of the country. To a great extent the successful fulfillment of obligations undertaken and implementation of thematic plans for technical creativity will depend on how active and full of initiative the invention committees and VOIR soviets will be.

9069

CSO: 1801/339

ARMED FORCES

RESULTS OF WINTER TACTICAL TRAINING NOTED

Odessa Military District Inadequacies

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 83 p 2

[Article by Colonel L. Shebanov, Red Banner Odessa Military District: "Bitter Lessons, Thoughts on Winter Training Results"]

[Text] Analysis of what has been accomplished, identification of the causes of deficiencies and efforts to find ways to achieve further improvement in our field, flight and naval training programs are all critical components of the many-sided effort involved in preparing for the summer training period. The article we publish below discusses some of the lessons to be learned from the inspection conducted in units [chast'] of the Odessa Military District.

In conversations following the inspection with officers of subunits [podrazdeleniye] whose personnel had failed to fulfill their obligations in socialist competition one would frequently hear the comment that the main thing that kept them from achieving their winter training goals was deficiencies in fire training. And at first glance that would indeed seem to have been the case: during tactical exercises with field firing, for example, the motorized rifle troops of one of the regiments had failed to destroy a substantial number of the targets with which they had been presented.

But still, if you look a little more closely at the reasons for their lack of success, it isn't hard to see that the problem involved more than simply the state of their fire training.

As we all know, an ability to destroy the enemy with effective fire in modern-day combat is inconceivable without at the same time having achieved a high level of tactical competence. Fire training for motorized rifle troops, tankers and personnel in other branches of the service must, of course, be looked at together with tactics as an integral whole. This is the point of view the inspectors based themselves on in evaluating the performance of these motorized rifle troops in tactical exercises involving field firing. And from the point of view of tactics, their performance was indeed, to put it bluntly, not the best. And this had an impact on their firing scores. Tactical errors on the part of some officers made it impossible for their men to demonstrate the full range of their firing skills, and this despite the fact that, from the point of view of

firing skills, many of them were not all that badly trained. The results of many of the firing sessions I have had the opportunity to visit are evidence of this. And what is more, the targets the soldiers and sergeants of the subunits which were the subjects of this inspection had fired at during their final exercises with field firing had, after all, quite a few holes in them.

Something else again is the fact that they failed to fire on many of their targets on the battlefield at all because they did not see them. Following an attack in the direction of the battalion commanded by Major V. Sinitsyn, for example, the inspectors found dozens of holes in some of the targets but none at all in others. This was to a great extent a consequence of the fact that the subunits failed to maintain effective fire and maneuver control. We can look at the following incident, for example, as evidence of this. The company commanded by Captain A. Kruglikov was late in reaching its assigned line; and, leaving "enemy" targets on its own flank completely untouched, proceeded to open fire on targets which had already been fired on by other subunits.

There were also cases in which, with full knowledge on the part of senior commanders, performance requirements were obviously relaxed in an effort to maintain appearances during an attack. This is what happened, for example, in the case of Major V. Sinitsyn's battalion. Seeing that one of his subunits was lagging a little behind, Lieutenant Colonel V. Nesterov gave the command to keep up with the other subunits—"To keep the assault line even...." This letup in the attack, slight though it was, then cost the motorized rifle troops dearly—they had to rush their fire, and fire from greater distances to boot, what with the fact that by the time they reached the firing line the targets had already disappeared.

The attack failed. Finding themselves in a situation which was not quite what they were accustomed to, the troops proved unable to demonstrate the firing skills they in fact possess. A number of them committed errors in determining range and in making various types of correction. The grenade launcher operators were responsible for an especially large number of errors. In attempting to repel an "enemy" counterattack, some of them sent almost all their grenades wide of their targets.

The exercises conducted during the final phase of the winter training period revealed that some units are not rigorously adhering to the principle that the soldier should learn what he would need to know in actual combat. One of the requirements this principle imposes, as we all know, is that exercise situations should be such as to spur trainees to creative action and force them to exert a maximum of effort, that is, they should be nearly as possible approximate situations which would be encountered in actual combat. The unit we are looking at here was too late in giving attention to these requirements. The subunits spent the entire winter training period on the same training ground rehearsing a simplistic situation. When they were required to fire the troops already knew what kind of targets would appear where and when and what sight setting they had to use to fire on them. There was firing, but there were no tactics. Some of the younger officers even began to get accustomed to the idea that the most important thing about an exercise involving field firing was to destroy as many targets as possible; everything else was of secondary importance.

The result was that a number of subunit commanders continued to be guided by that kind of thinking even during their final exercises. I have already told about some instances of this approach to things. We could cite some other examples as well. Battalion commander Captain Ye. Sagan', for example, deliberately slowed the pace of his attack as he approached the "enemy's" forward edge, that is, at precisely the point at which he

...and he stepped it up. But the officer wanted in this way to give his men a chance to get a better look at the targets and to sight more carefully.

"No matter how skillfully you solve your tactical problem," Captain Sagan' declared in attempting to justify his action, "success on the battlefield depends above all upon being able to fire at the enemy and destroy him. If you've got the holes, then you've applied your tactics."

And in this instance, as we have seen, the tactics were not applied—the battalion proved unable fully to accomplish its combat training mission.

The evaluation of performances in tactical exercises involving field firing does, it is true, depend in large part upon the number of targets you destroy. But the effectiveness of your fire is going to be governed by other factors besides the ability of your personnel to fire with accuracy. Only a solid combination of marksmanship and tactical skills is going to insure effective employment of weapons on the modern-day battlefield.

Also responsible for the fact that the importance of this factor is sometimes underestimated are those whose responsibility it is to monitor the state of training of our subunits and units, and this includes we representatives of the various district directorates. It is generally known that the tactical performance of our personnel is not subjected to the same rigorous scoring as, for example, are firing results. So perhaps for this reason the evaluation of performance in this category, perhaps to an even greater extent than evaluations of field fire performance, depends upon the objectivity and devotion to principle of those doing the evaluating. It must be confessed that we not infrequently see cases in which firing results are good, and then we find tactics given the same evaluation. It was precisely this, it is clear, that Captain Sagan' was counting upon as well. He was counting on it because in doing their checking, officers from the district's VUZ's and combat training directorate, as it turned out, were jacking up the ratings they were giving on tactics if the test subjects showed good accuracy in their field fire.

But on this occasion, however, the inspectors demonstrated their devotion to principle and called things as they saw them: many as a result could not escape a poor rating. Here we see clearly established the following relationship: bitter lessons fell the lot of those who gunned exclusively for numbers of holes in targets during the winter training period and neglected their tactics.

...until an exercise directed by Captain Yu. Shaganov. The officer gave the subunits the signal to advance. Deploying first in their prebattle, then in their battle formations, they moved out into an open area clearly visible to the "enemy." The "enemy", of course, then opened fire. To avoid getting hit, the subunits had to move on out of the area quickly. But there then came the command...to halt.

It turned out that the right-flank company had fallen behind. But the commander wanted his attack to be both rapid and well-coordinated since senior officers were observing the performance of these subunits. In the meantime, however, there was another way he could organize a coordinated attack. He had only to calculate the time it would take the right-flank company to reach the assault line and then start it ahead of the others. And this isn't the only way out of this situation. If it was necessary for all the subunits to begin their advance out of the area simultaneously, the right-flank company should simply have increased its speed. But none of these things was done.

Need we really talk about how costly a mistake like this would be in actual combat? And not only mistakes like this. When these subunits halted and hit the ground, waiting for the company to catch up, not one of the trainees even attempted to entertain.

Tankers in the battalion commanded by Captain V. Dorofeyev also neglected tactics during the exercises. Crews tried to destroy only their main-gun targets and paid no attention to machine-gun targets. In moving rapidly to press home their attack, moreover, the battalion broke away from the motorized rifle subunits. Cooperation broke down. Had this occurred in actual combat, the tankers would have suffered heavy losses in close-range fighting from antitank weapons without the support of the motorized rifle troops. When the regimental commander finally attempted to remedy the situation somehow, there was no more firing time left.

We have been dwelling here so far on only negative aspects of the training given personnel of some subunits, deficiencies which came to light during the inspectors' checks. This should not, of course, be taken to mean that we did absolutely nothing but mark time during the winter training period or that district personnel have no accomplishments in field or flight training to their credit which they can be proud of and which can serve as guideposts for all in future efforts to achieve the improvements in combat skills called for in this training year's competition.

We have a small number of subunits which have achieved high ratings in all training categories, including tactical fire training. Over the course of the inspection the personnel of these subunits demonstrated good operational teamwork and an ability effectively to exploit the full range of capabilities of organizational weapons and equipment to execute complex tactical missions. The more conspicuous the accomplishments of the leaders, however, the more obvious the deficiencies we talked about above.

We can easily understand that commanders, political organs, staff personnel and party and Komsomol organizations see one of their top-priority tasks now to consist in eliminating training deficiencies as quickly as possible. Much here, however, will depend upon the extent to which they draw the proper conclusions for themselves from their analysis of the winter's combat training results and upon what steps they will now take in preparing for the summer training period to insure that units and subunits strike out on a course toward improving the tactical skills and marksmanship of their personnel from the very first day.

Need to Improve Tactical Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 83 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Podashov, motorized rifle regiment commander: "Beyond the Customary Routine, Thoughts on Winter Training Results"]

[Text] A look at his operational map, checkered over with its symbols reflecting the tactical situation on the battlefield, and most probably every commander will see the routine picture of things: tanks and infantry combat vehicles advancing, the artillery firing, air strikes by the aviation.... Everything, it seems, is what he's used to, what he's familiar with. In actual fact, however, he would be hard put to confine the modern-day military engagement, in which operations will be conducted by the combined and coordinated forces of subunits [podrazdeleniye] of all branches of the service and

characterized by extensive fronts and depths, operations unfolding at unprecedented rates and extensive employment of a variety of weapons and equipment, within the framework of one of his conventional plans. Creativity on the part of the commander, to include questions involving the employment of weapons and equipment, will always play a role of the greatest importance.

Let's say a motorized rifle regiment is involved in an engagement. It disposes of everything it needs for independent execution of difficult tactical missions. It concentrates within itself, one might say, almost all branches of the service. In addition to his motorized rifle, tank and artillery subunits, the regiment commander will also dispose of subunits of special forces, he can call upon the support of the aviation... In a word, the motorized rifle regiment is a most complex living organism. It is at the same time a unique sort of technical system. How important the desire to exploit the high combat capabilities of weapons and equipment to the full under these conditions.

I recall the following incident. Two battalions were approaching one another in a meeting engagement in the course of an exercise. The two commanders, Lieutenant Colonel V. Terekhin and Major A. Novokshonov, appeared to be reading one another's mind. As soon as one of them would try to maneuver into a more advantageous position, the other side would immediately counter the move.

At first it appeared that the initiative lay with Major Novokshonov. He attacked the "enemy" vigorously and quickly concentrated his men and equipment in the main direction. It soon became clear, however, that he was not going to be successful. An excessive concentration of weapons and equipment in one narrow sector limited his ability to maneuver. The battalion was attacking in too much of a straight line.

At this point Lieutenant Colonel Terekhin departed from the conventional model of the meeting engagement. Conceding the "enemy" an advantageous position, he was able to contain his straightforward thrust with his march security forces and fire from his attached artillery. He himself, meanwhile, was withdrawing his own second-echelon subunits to the rear. It should be pointed out here that all this was taking place on difficult terrain. It helped that the personnel involved were capable of exploiting the battalion's weapons and equipment to the limits of their capabilities, as is well known. They fired their guided missiles, for example, for their maximum design range. The infantry combat vehicles negotiated a mountain incline at just the critical angle.

After our sessions in our officers training program we took a detailed look at the performance of the battalion commanders and other officers who participated in the exercise. Mention was made of Lieutenant Colonel Terekhin's creative approach to the operational employment of his weapons and equipment. But then somebody voiced the opinion that his decision was ill-advised; it involved too much risk, this individual declared. Then he started in with his reasons: if the machines hadn't been able to negotiate the steep slope, if the antitank gunners hadn't been able to destroy their targets at that extreme range and if....

All that, it's true, could well have been the case. But not in this instance. The battalion commander was able to act boldly and resolutely precisely because his decision was based upon precise calculation, thorough knowledge of the capabilities of his weapons and equipment and confidence in the competence of his men.

Many officers began to take a different view of technical training after this exercise. And in organizing its officers training program the regimental staff, too, began to make more of an effort to look at the execution of any tactical mission through the prism of weapon and equipment capabilities.

The challenges in this area offer many opportunities for our officers competition, in the organization of which we strive for practical realization of the slogan "Master new equipment on a higher plane." In evaluating our officers' competition performance we look, in addition to all the other figures, at their ability effectively to exploit the capabilities of their weapons and equipment on the battlefield.

Now I'm not saying that all of us have already learned how to do this. There are still some officers in the regiment who have yet to be able to break away from their hide-bound approach to the organization of a combat operation, and this is because they do not yet possess adequate knowledge of their organizational weapons and equipment and its capabilities.

We have only to look at an exercise conducted during the final phase of the winter training period. A company commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Smirnov was assigned the mission of preventing the "enemy" from occupying an advantageous position and then supporting the engagement of the main battalion force. I'm not going to analyze this officer's performance in any great detail. I will point out only that the company was slow in advancing to the line at which it was to go over to the attack despite the fact that it had plenty of time. What was it that had happened?

The company commander had his traffic timetable, and the nominal speeds had all been computed. The route, however, proved to be much more difficult to negotiate than had been anticipated. So movement was naturally a little slower than what plans called for. What could have been done in this situation? The company commander disposed of a combat engineer subunit and tanks fitted with bulldozer blades. Had he had a little more wit and imagination, of course, he could have used them to speed things along. But his addiction to established solutions controlled his thinking in this situation.

Our attention is caught by the following detail. This particular officer had not, in fact, performed all that poorly in the officers training program. So how did it happen that he proved unable to solve a problem which, after all, wasn't so terribly difficult?

The answer is that, as a rule, the training and exercises conducted during the course of the officers training program still incorporate a number of simplistic situations. The lack of any really rigorous evaluation of officer skills results in a situation in which scores entered in the officers training record books do not always correspond to the actual state of affairs.

Much here will depend, of course, upon those in charge of the exercises, upon their sense of responsibility for their assigned task. The regimental staff monitors their preparations continuously. Senior officers of the various branches of the service and the various services are called upon to play an active role in exercises involving subunit officers.

We realize that the instruction planned and scheduled as part of our officers training program will not alone solve the problem of improving professional officer skills. We

Finally, one of our tasks to lie in working for further improvement in the independent study program. During the winter training period special attention has been given to individual problem-solving assignments. Each officer is assigned to study a particular problem involving the employment of one type of weapon or piece of equipment or another in mountain forest terrain and, in accordance with his own observations, to offer suggestions for improving our troop training methods.

This has been of interest to our officers. In the process of completing his individual assignment, Major I. Tustov, for example, developed a plan for a command post exercise. He had performed all his calculations relating to the employment of weapons and equipment with reference to very rugged terrain with many water obstacles. The study was discussed with the officers. They made Major Tustov a number of useful recommendations. His theoretical calculations were then checked against real-world practice. The study was again enriched by interesting observations taking into account the experience of commanders of a number of subunits.

Yet even from the stereotyped solutions we ordinarily see applied to the employment of weapons and equipment during our exercises, we will occasionally have to overcome the force of inertia in the personnel training methods we use. But much here will depend upon the regimental party committee and the subunit party organizations.

From the beginning of the winter combat training period the regiment received several of the latest simulators. This would give us a chance to intensify our training. I was sure our subunit commanders would lose no time in mastering the operation of this new equipment. A number of them, however, continued as before to use the old training equipment. What we were seeing was an attachment to established routine and a lack of desire to put out the additional effort which would be required to master the new equipment.

We had somehow to develop a new consciousness on the part of our people. The question of innovative approaches to the troop-training process was raised in the course of an expanded meeting of the party committee. One of the party committee members, company commander Senior Lieutenant A. Mel'nikov, volunteered to conduct an experiment—having himself thoroughly mastered the use of the simulators, he would develop a system for improving gunner-operator skills. His suggestion was accepted. The result was that after themselves practicing on the new simulators, gunner-operators in Senior Lieutenant Mel'nikov's company were soon turning out the highest scores in test exercises.

This unique experiment not only helped us convince all our commanders of the advantages to be derived from our new simulators. Senior Lieutenant Mel'nikov had also developed effective new methods of training gunner-operators and infantry combat vehicle commanders. Battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Terekhin, his technical supply officer, Major S. Loshmanov, and a platoon commander, Senior Lieutenant P. Dragomeretskiy, all became enthusiastic advocates of the practical introduction of these methods.

The attention given to the new and the innovative was, of course, reflected in comparative results for the winter period as well. This could be seen particularly clearly in the results our officers turned in during the past inspection. Their tactical-fire and technical military training scores were up. Many raised their proficiency rating. We can point in particular to the fact that almost all the officers in Lieutenant Colonel's Terekhin's battalion now have a 1st-class rating.

We realize, of course, that what we have accomplished is by no means the limit. As we now prepare for the coming summer training period we are critically evaluating what we have achieved and trying to place at the disposal of all our personnel the experience of those who have achieved the highest training scores and learned to exploit the combat capabilities built into our weapons and equipment with maximum effectiveness.

We also have unexploited potential to tap. Placing greater personal responsibility on each officer for the state of his own training is one of the most important examples. What we are talking about here, I think, is not simply the rigorousness of the demands being made here. The experience of our leading subunits demonstrates that greater success is achieved where this is accomplished as part of an integrated effort, where, in addition to the greater demands placed upon the officers, the attempt is made to instill in them an urge to strive for the creative solution, where they are taught not only to take advantage of available experience, but to strike out farther as well, beyond the confines of the customary routine. All our personnel, our staff and our regimental party organization have now oriented themselves in the direction of such an effort. We see one of the conditions of successful accomplishment of the tasks facing the regiment during the current training year to lie in an aggressive search for new ways to increase the effectiveness with which we exploit the capabilities of our weapons and equipment on the battlefield.

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ARMED FORCES

ZSU-57-2 SELF-PROPELLED ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 83 (signed to press 8 Feb 83) p 42

[Article by Eng-Col V. Knyaz'kov: "Against Air and Ground Targets"]

[Text] Upon seeing this combat vehicle for the first time, the uninitiated individual would say without hesitation that he is looking at a tank.

In fact, all of the characteristics are there: track drive, armored hull, armored turret. The armament is somewhat unusual, to be sure--two gun barrels protrude from the turret.

It is not a tank, however, but the ZSU[Self-Propelled Antiaircraft Artillery Gun]-57-2. The number "57" indicates the gun's caliber, "2" the number of barrels. The specialists define the ZSU-57-2 as a lightly armored, tracked combat vehicle with rotating turret, which provides for all-round fire against air and ground targets. The latter feature, we state frankly, is extremely valuable for modern combined-arms combat. The unit is capable of defending troops against an air enemy in an offensive or in a defense, and of plastering enemy infantry, tanks and other equipment with fire at any time.

The basic parts of the antiaircraft artillery gun are an armored hull and turret, the weapons, a power unit and transmission, tracks and suspension, electrical equipment, communication and fire-fighting equipment. The armored hull consists of three sections: a driving compartment, a fighting compartment and an engine compartment. The first compartment is at the side of the hull nose, where all of the mechanisms for controlling the unit's movement are located; the second is in the mid-section and turret, where the armament and ammunition are located. The engine compartment occupies the vehicle's rear section, where the engine and all the mechanisms for the unit's functioning are mounted.

The antiaircraft artillery unit is equipped with twin, 57mm automatic antiaircraft guns--automatic guns with a maximum vertical firing range of 8,800 meters and a maximum horizontal range of 12,000 meters. It should be borne in mind, however, that the main purpose of the self-propelled unit is to furnish effective fire against air targets moving at altitudes of up to 4,000 meters.

The automatic guns fire at the truly furious rate of up to 240 rounds/minute. Compare this, for example, with the 57mm antitank gun with semi-automatic breech

mechanism used during the Great Patriotic War, which had a maximum firing rate of 15 rounds/minute. Remember also that we are not talking about a machine gun, but about a cannon, which fires a shell weighing 7.8 kilograms with a muzzle velocity of 1,000 meters/second.

The automatic mechanism employs the barrel's short recoil. The antiaircraft unit can destroy targets flying in any direction, since the horizontal traverse is unlimited. The barrels have an angle of fire of up to 85° and an angle of depression of 5° . An important feature of the unit is its employment of electro-hydraulic drives for rotating the turret and raising the gun. For example, the turret can rotate at a speed of up to 30° per second. This is an important feature, since, if necessary, fire can be shifted to the opposite direction (180°) in only 5 seconds.

The gun can fire two types of fixed artillery rounds: one with a tracer-fitted fragmentation grenade and an impact nose fuse with a self-destruction device; the other, an armor-piercing projectile with tracer, which has a base fuse. The ZSU-57-2 has an ammo load of 300 gunnery rounds. The automatic guns are fed by means of clips, each with a capacity of 4 rounds. The rounds are fed to the rammer from the side (left or right).

The automatic antiaircraft sighting device performs the difficult function of determining the point at which the shell will encounter the target, for firing at an air enemy. It must have such data as the target's speed, course angle and slant range. Where do they come from? The speed is determined by the type of aircraft; the course angle, from the visible direction of movement; and the range is measured by eye or with a range-finder.

The unit has a crew of six. These include the commander, a gunner, a sight setter, left and right loaders. They are all stationed in the turret, their seats being arranged on the right and left sides of the gun. The mechanic/driver, located in the driving compartment, controls the unit's movement.

The antiaircraft gunners do not need to select and set up a fire position in order to open fire readily against attacking enemy aircraft. Wherever the armored vehicle stops, that is the fire position. The area only has to be relatively level. A minor inconvenience is required to convert the antiaircraft unit from traveling to firing mode. The homeland's designers saw to this. Suffice it to set two canvas covers of canvas covers are placed on the muzzles of the barrels, and the crew does not have to leave the vehicle in order to remove them.

It is the commander's mission to track an air target and determine its range, course and speed. He then better immediately feeds these data into the proper devices. He then continuously adjusts the range setting throughout the firing process. The gunner sweeps the cross-wires of the sight focused on the target by means of a special device, using electrohydraulic drives. He is also the one who presses the electric trigger. The two loaders assist continuously in firing. They are responsible for feeding the rounds into the magazines as rapidly as necessary. This operation is rather simple but it might not seem worth mentioning. Even ally with the ZSU-57-2, however. The loaders must therefore be physically strong and well-trained soldiers.

When the clips are removed from the fighting compartment by a special device. A "rattles" belt with metal angle-bars travels along a shaft on rollers, grasps the cases and clips and removes them to a cartridge receptacle. The receiver is mounted immediately on the inside of the gun mount. It is automatically engaged as soon as the gunner presses the electric trigger.

The ZSU-57-2 has a 520hp engine, which easily moves the 28-ton armored vehicle. The ZSU-57-2 can negotiate various kinds of obstacles, both natural and artificial. Maximum angles of climb and roll are 30°. It can cross over a ditch which is not more than 2.7 meters wide. The antiaircraft artillery gun cannot "swim," but it can ford water up to 1.4 meters deep. The vehicle can "take" a vertical bank 30m high.

Although the ZSU-57-2 weighs a good deal, the specific pressure of the tracks on the ground is relatively low--only 0.63 kilograms/square centimeter. The tracks are wide 580 millimeters. Consequently, their area of contact is large enough for the vehicle to travel relatively easily through snow-covered and swampy terrain.

The self-propelled antiaircraft gun has a clearance--the distance between the earth's surface and the bottom of the vehicle--of 425mm. This is extremely important for traveling in rocky or sandy terrain, in woods, and so forth. The antiaircraft unit is extremely maneuverable, turning practically in place, literally on a "dime" (one track is fully braked, while the other turns and moves the vehicle). Minimal turn radius is the same as the track width--2,640 millimeters.

The vehicle can travel on dirt roads at an average speed of 25-30 kilometers per hour and on a highway, at speeds of up to 35-40 kilometers per hour. The engine makes it possible to accelerate the vehicle to a maximum speed of 48-50 kilometers per hour. One of the most important technical features of any self-propelled unit is its range. The ZSU-57-2 has a range of 300-320 kilometers on dirt roads and 400-420 kilometers on highways, without refueling.

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ARMED FORCES

WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN MILITARY EXAMINED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 83 (signed to press 24 Feb 83) p 30

[Article by Colonel V. Storozhenko: "Female Warrant Officers"]

[Text] The USSR universal military service law provides that women having special training can be taken as volunteers for active military service.

Practical experience demonstrates that women faultlessly and skillfully discharge the official warrant officer responsibilities in many positions and make an important contribution to maintenance of the combat readiness of their units and subunits. They perform most successfully in specialties associated with communication equipment maintenance, materiel storage and accounting, clerical work, rendering medical aid to servicemen etc. Organizing the reception of women into the service as warrant officers [praporshchiki i michmany] accordingly constitutes one of the important functions of our commanders, political and personnel organizations and military commissariats.

The results we achieve here will depend entirely upon how energetically and purposefully we organize this effort, how congenially and encouragingly we deal with candidates who have expressed their desire to become warrant officers and how well we explain to them what military service is like and the rights and privileges they will be entitled to. The reception process will be the more successful, of course, if local authorities, social organizations, administrative bodies and enterprises participate in it as well.

It must be kept in mind here that the people in charge of every military unit, institution, facility and organization must provide the essential housing and personal services for their women and give strict attention to insuring the maintenance of their health, seeing that all other service members are congenial and encouraging in their attitudes toward them and insuring proper regulation of the use of on-duty time. Creation of these conditions will contribute to success in bringing in the specialists we need from among women, in securing their service in the military for extended periods of time and to their success in discharging the responsibilities placed upon them.

Women desiring to enter the military service as warrant officers must in turn meet a number of requirements: the military accepts women having higher or specialized secondary education, who are no older than 30, who come favorably recommended from an employer, institution or school and the state of whose health suits them for a particular specialty in the armed forces. It is also to be desired that prior to the beginning of their military service they already have accumulated the requisite fund of practical experience in their specialties.

Women are accepted as volunteers for a minimum enlistment of five years. They may re-enlist for minimum periods of three years. Candidates are selected by military unit commanders and rayon (city) military commissariats with the assistance of representatives of personnel organs.

Women desiring to enter military service as warrant officers submit a written agreement to serve for the stipulated period of time and present personal documents including work and party or Komsomol references, educational records and birth certificate. Those accepted for military service as warrant officers enjoy all rights and privileges established for service members in this category. They must work continuously to improve their military, political and professional knowledge, render unexceptionable service in discharging their official responsibilities, comply with all provisions of military regulations and the military oath and set examples of discipline and faultless conduct. They remain eligible for active duty until age 45, although if necessary some, with their consent, may be retained for up to five additional years.

Successful military duty performance entitles them, with all attendant privileges, to enroll in correspondence or evening courses offered by civilian institutions of higher education in areas related to their military specialty or which will help improve the specialized knowledge they need to perform their professional military duties.

Female warrant officers also enjoy special privileges and benefits permitting them to combine their public social responsibilities with their own private, child-rearing responsibilities in an efficient way. Among other things, they can take leave during pregnancy and confinement (while continuing to draw their pay and allowances and rations in kind) and, if they desire (and have completed at least one year of service), they may take partially paid leave to care for a child until it is one year old. In addition to that, they can, if they wish, take additional leave without pay and allowances and rations in kind to care for a child until it reaches the age of 18 months. These periods of leave are treated as active-duty time, not as interruptions of active military service. Depending upon their place of service, they will also receive a one-time payment from the government upon the birth of their child in the amount and according to procedures establishing in existing legislation.

Upon their request and with the approval of their organizational command, women may be granted early discharges from military service to give birth to a child, but in so doing they forfeit the possibility of continuing to serve in their current positions. They may, of course, be discharged on other grounds as well, because they have completed their required period of service, for example, or due to age or illness.

Other service-related questions will be resolved on the usual bases, questions having to do, for example, with transfers to other units, awards, housing assignments and pensions.

Existing rights and benefits and the general arrangements under which women accepted for military duty as warrant officers fulfill their service obligations thus permit them to devote themselves to the military profession for extended periods of time and to make their contribution to the defense of our motherland.

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AIR FORCES

TRAINING EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Apr 83 p 1

[Article by Lt. Col. G. Ivanov: "The Air Battle is a Hot One"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel Genadiy Petrovich Ivanov has been named senior permanent correspondent for the Red Banner Central Asian Military District. In today's issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA we are publishing his first report on the combat training of the military fliers.

The outline of the pinnacled mountain ridge, turbaned in brilliant white snow, appeared to be slowly emerging right next to the airfield in the early morning haze. The sound of fighters taking off, afterburners roaring, swept out to the mountains and then returned in a soft echo. A tactical flight exercise was beginning in the Guards air regiment. This exercise would wind up the winter combat training for the unit's fightingmen.

From the command post one had a perfect view of the tense situation developing in the air. The numerous target blips on the green-hued radar screens represented the "enemy," which had broken through to the guarded object.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Guards Colonel V. Kot, commander of the air regiment, had just ordered airmen of the squadron commanded by Guards Major V. Lysenko to scramble and intercept the "enemy." Now he was following the development of events in the sky with great attention. One felt that Viktor Sevast'yanovich was confident--his excellent squadron would emerge victorious from the battle.

The regimental commander's eyes literally beamed energy. At this point Guards Colonel Kot was there, heart and soul, in the stratosphere, where the fighters were flying out to intercept the high-speed, maneuvering targets. The attackers were drawn closer and closer to them. Viktor Sevast'yanovich knew who was in the cockpits of the other side's aircraft. They were led, he told me, by Guards Captain Valeriy Semenov, holder of the Order of the Red Star and military pilot first-class, who had a great deal of experience in flying missile-carrying aircraft for combat employment over mountains and desert, in an extremely complex tactical situation. Lysenko would also be able to demonstrate a high level of combat skill, though (the regimental commander's voice warmed as he told this). Incidentally, he also holds the Order of the Red Star.

The "enemy" plan was taking shape in the movement of the blips representing the aircraft on the radar screens. "Regroup!" Guards Colonel Kot ordered, and then told the interceptors exactly what to do.

The squadron, obedient to the regimental commander's will, performed the necessary regrouping. The targets began maneuvering vigorously. Viktor Sevast'yanovich had foreseen this maneuver also, however. And the victorious "First missile--launch! Second missile--launch!" came through the air from on-board the aircraft.

The aerial fighting was intense. Granted, the launchings were practice ones that day, with the firing accuracy recorded on film, but the pilots were giving their all to the battle, were performing assertively and with good tactical skill. It became especially tense in the air, when the flight led by Guards Captain V. Ozarko went out to intercept the aircraft flown by Guards Major G. Pudovkin, ace military pilot and seasoned air fighter. Each of the attackers was to perform a photo-launching for the record within a specific period of time.

At the beginning of the winter training period some of the airmen on the flight would have been unable to perform such a mission. Now, however, they all performed the mission with excellence. Once again, however, complications developed in the exercise situation. A hypothetical problem assigned by the examiner called for the airmen to support an attack by a motorized rifle subunit. The group of missile carriers was led into battle by Lysenko, and it was soon learned that the master combat pilots had destroyed the compact targets with accurate fire.

The thunder of jets gradually died down over the mountains. The tactical flight exercise was coming to an end. Major General of Aviation Yu. Vladimirov, deputy commander of the district air forces, who had observed the action, noted with satisfaction:

"The regimental personnel perform with confidence, unerringly, on land and in the air. The regiment has fulfilled the combat training plan and the extensive socialist commitments, completely and well."

At headquarters for the district air forces, people were of the unanimous opinion that the success of the regiment, which had been an excellent one for the 10th year in a row, was due in great part to the purposive, hard work of the commander. Guards Colonel V. Kot had himself performed many flights for combat employment. He personally taught the squadron commanders the skill of aerial combat and painstakingly passed on his experience in organizing the training, skillfully relying upon the unit party committee in his work. At the commander's initiative and with his support, an active search was conducted in the regiment during the winter training period for reserves for enhancing combat readiness and the class ratings of the airmen. The following is an example of this.

Fightermen in the squadron commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel K. Rybnikov had accepted large commitments for the winter training period. The commitments called for every other pilot to achieve a first-class rating. Rybnikov, however,

a recent graduate of a military academy, lacked practical skills in organizing the training and the competition. Guards Colonel Kot and his deputy for flight training helped the young commander to compile a thoroughly conceived plan of air training for the fightingmen and individual assignments for each, which called for improvement of his class rating.

It is not a simple task to fulfill that sort of plan. Adverse weather conditions are not encountered frequently in the mountains where the airfield is located, only at the beginning of the year. The aviators managed to take advantage of these, however, with maximum benefit for themselves. And the plan helped to precisely coordinate the extremely complicated organism of the airfield to operate smoothly and without excessive stress.

Guards Colonel Kot helped Guards Lieutenant Colonel Rybnikov also in another area--the establishment of irreproachable regulation order in the squadron. He taught him to be strictly demanding of his subordinates, with precise ideas about ways to develop the needed qualities in them. This is the way it was done in the case of Guards Senior Lieutenant R. Mukhametrakhimov, for example. This pilot was making errors during landings. When it became apparent that they were caused by Mukhametrakhimov's excessive self-confidence and reduced demandingness of himself, the regimental commander gave several pieces of advice to his immediate chief as to how he could best influence the young officer. The strict demandingness combined with assistance provided the pilot by the veteran instructors produced good results. In this tactical flight exercise Mukhametrakhimov had performed the mission with great skill.

The combat equipment also passed the rigid test in the air. Credit for this goes to the unit's air force engineering service, which is commanded by Guards Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel G. Budnik. During the critique of the flight Guards Colonel Kot thanked the engineers, technicians and mechanics for the fact that the fighters had been well prepared for the mission, bettering the norm by 5%.

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CSO: 1801/303

AIR FORCES

REFUELING ACCIDENT REPORTED

Moscow NEDEL'YA in Russian 13 Apr 83 p 10

[Report by Anatoliy Zorin and Yuriy Ivashchenko, Unit "X": "Return from a Flight"]

[Text] The missile carrier taxied onto the flightline. The airmen rubbed their faces to get rid of the imprints left by the oxygen masks. They were tired. Tired as never before.

Warrant Officer Viktor Kireyev, senior gunner/radio operator, crawled out from the upper canopy, where he had been stationed during the flight, and took his place next to the navigator. The hatch was raised with the hydraulic system. They could now leave the aircraft. Kireyev looked through the hatch opening. After the brightness of the clouds, the concrete appeared pearl-like, homey and friendly. A tangle of tumbleweed rolled against him, and its interwoven branches touched him with a sense of muddled earthliness.... Kireyev straightened his shoulders and took a deep breath, drinking in the simple joys of the earth.

The crew left the aircraft to the thundering strains of music played by the regimental band. After hearing the aircraft commander's report, the senior chief made a brief speech and expressed the service's gratitude to the crew.... When he awoke the next day, Kireyev glanced at his watch and saw that he had slept a full 24 hours. He took a bucket, went into the bathroom, filled the bucket with water and went outside. Three poplars grew there in front of the windows. Kireyev first watered his daughter's poplar, then his wife's, and then his own.

As a boy Kireyev had worked in the fields as a trailer coupler. When he returned in the evening his mother would pretend that she did not recognize him in his mask of black dust. She would call him "comrade" and address him with the formal "Vy." His father, Aleksey Kireyev, had been left somewhere in Poland, in the war-scorched earth. Viktor had begun shouldering all the duties of a grown man. He became an electrician and traveled all over Belgorod Oblast as a member of a brigade, setting up poles and running the wire.

Later, in the Air Forces, he saw enormous strategic aircraft, like fantastic birds they were, and was amazed by them. As his service term progressed Kireyev decided that he would tell his superior, Major Shchotov: "I'm going to reenlist." And that is what he did. He remained in the Air Forces. Now, he had been flying for so many years, with enjoyment, and performing with excellence.

...On Monday the crew had gathered at the airfield. After the formation was dismissed they went into a classroom for their briefing. They were to fly an ordinary mission. They received their charts and weapons.

Our strategic, or long-range, aviation has many glorious deeds to its credit, including performances like the bombing of Berlin during the very first days of the war. Today, our aircraft can perform a broad range of missions, thanks to their great flight range, which was made possible when they mastered aerial refueling techniques. The crew would also be working on this aspect of the training.

...Just before dawn, after having completed the main part of the flight, they headed for a meeting with a flying tanker. "Commander, we are in the refueling zone," the navigator reported. "Crew, be alert," Major Biryukov ordered in response.

Kireyev had a fine view through the canopy (the highest point in the fuselage). He was also peering vigilantly in to the star-studded night. He suddenly had the impression that one group of firefly-like lights was not following the pattern of the others against the black backdrop. Viktor reported: "Commander, I see the tanker off to the left."

The aircraft began coming together. The commander increased the speed and brought the missile carrier into the tanker's wake. At an altitude of several kilometers and flying at a speed of 800 kilometers per hour, the aircraft were separated by some 100 meters.

A long hose with a heavy cone at the end emerged, snake-like, from the tanker. Kireyev directed the beam of a searchlight upon the twisting form. He aimed the light so that the shadow from the hose fell on the tanker's belly. When the dark strip ran through the very center of the lighted area, this would be a certain sign that the aircraft were flying precisely one behind the other. The commander was lining them up vertically.

The hose was writhing up near the tanker, but who knew just what the end of the hose was doing right in front of the missile carrier? Just try to insert a hose attached to the fuselage into a cone at the end of a hose.

At just the right moment, the commander gave it the gas. The aircraft sprang forward, and the nozzle went through the opening. The locks closed, and a light flashed on, announcing: "We have contact." Fuel began pouring into the tanks.

They had taken on a fair amount of fuel, when it happened. The missile carrier shuddered as though it had bumped into some sort of obstacle, and plummeted. The hose was torn loose from beneath the tanker's belly. The aircraft went into a dive. The elevator was jammed by the hose. Below was the ocean.

"Crew! Prepare to abandon the aircraft!" the commander's order is law. Each of the crew members was thinking that probably no one would remain alive after plunging into the stormy waters. There was no communication. It had ended when the antenna was torn off.

Warrant Officer Vasily Vil'tsov, second navigator, flipped on the "SOS" switch. What good would it do now, though? They should attempt to make the coast. Perhaps they could try to cut off the hose....

"Commander, request permission to cut the hose with a knife through the air vent!" Kireyev was struck by the unexpectedness of his own decision. And why not? The elevators would be freed, the aircraft would level off, and it was only a stone's throw to the coast.

"Go ahead and try, Vitya...."

Viktor slid from the turret and entered the cockpit. Captain Zaytsev, pilot on the right, opened the air vent. A compact, unearthly stream of icy air rushed through it.

"Koiya, hold on to my arm right here," Kireyev said to Zaytsev and indicated his elbow joint. "So that the stream of air doesn't break it."

Zaytsev nodded in agreement. Viktor reached his arm through the air vent. The incoming flow of air began to twist his arm, exactly like a powerful sumo wrestler on a mat. Kireyev pressed his arm against the body of the aircraft in an attempt to reduce the area of resistance. The icy cold stung his fingers through the glove.

Suddenly the hose flashed into view through the airvent. Kireyev threw out his arm, caught the hose and drew it to himself. At that point he almost moaned from the pain. Red dots flickered before his eyes, when the wind actually did twist his arm to the breaking point. The warrant officer's whole body jerked back, and he slowly closed his fist. It seemed to be responding, so it was not broken. Should he try once more?...

"No, there is no use in it." Zaytsev looked at him as though Zaytsev himself were somehow guilty. "We are traveling too fast...."

"Crew! Prepare to abandon the aircraft!"

Kireyev stirred himself. He tripped on something. It was as though someone had jerked him backward. He looked around. What was all that white cloth there between the seats? Wait a minute, it was someone's parachute canopy. Whose? Why it was his own parachute! He had apparently caught it on something while he was trying to grab the hose, breaking open the pack.... Kireyev gathered the thick silk into a ball and unfastened the straps encircling his chest and shoulders. What good were they now?

The missile carrier was falling. There was no sound in the headsets, even the crackling of the radio navigational aids had ceased. It seemed that everyone had decided to make the ultimate move--to jump. Warrant Officer Kireyev alone would abandon the aircraft last, when it was nearer to the water, after the stormy ocean had burst through the open hatch. He would be jumping without a parachute, jumping with only a life jacket and a boat. He also had a chance, although a slim one. He had to fight to the end, though.

They had been falling for a minute now. Approximately the same amount of time was left.

"Commander, request permission to break the canopy and shoot the hose off with my pistol," Kireyev said. "Or with the aircraft gun! Yes, that was it, he could focus the sight on the hose and... like a sewing machine, the stitching would cut right through it."

"Go ahead and fire, Vitya...."

His hands shook in time to the shots. Blinding trails rushed toward the paled stars. For a moment there seemed to be the smell of scorched rubber. But no....

The missile carrier continued to fall. The altitude was critical. Another 20 or 30 seconds, and the parachutes would be useless.

Kireyev turned his seat around and once more sent a white, fan-shaped path of fire into the night. He turned the aircraft gun and let loose with another round. He hit the hose!...

The missile carrier began climbing....

Various commands crowded into the headsets. The navigator was pinpointing the route, the commander was checking the map, and the aircraft technician was reporting how much fuel was left.

"Commander, the tail section has depressurized. The right canopy is broken. Junior Sergeant Shaposhnikov has been injured in the fact by fragments," reported Warrant Officer Brodov, in charge of the weapons.... After it had been severed by the fire, at the very end, before it sped off into space, the hose had slapped against the tail section and smashed to bits the plexiglass bubble surrounding the airborne gunner/radio operator. Fragments had slashed his face, and the blast of air had almost flung him out of the aircraft. He wiped his blood-covered face, pulled the largest fragments out of the wounds and reported to the commander by radio: "Junior Sergeant Shaposhnikov is ready to complete the flight mission"

...It would seem that an aircraft takes man away from the earth. This is not so, however. All of the earthly laws become even more imposing aboard the aircraft. Even closer bonds link the airman to earth, and all feelings for the earth are intensified. The wings are powerful because of their earthly origin. They are no longer simply parts of the aircraft. The wings represent loyalty to duty, represent skill and concern for the planet's future.

Test signals coming through the headset told Kireyev that an aircraft was headed toward them. Communication had been restored, even though within a small radius. Shaposhnikov had done an outstanding job! Viktor gave his call sign.

--"...", "..."--the unknown radio operator challenged. "Roger! "...," Kireyev responded. "You have a green light for your flight course. Go to the alternate airfield." "Roger. Thanks. Commander, we have to go to the alternate airfield." "Roger, Vitya. Thanks."

...The missile carrier touched down heavily onto the concrete, the black hole left by the broken canopy flashed by, and the aircraft swept down the runway. The crew members sat silently in their seats. The loosened gasmasks swung lethargically below the headsets. The hatch was raised by the hydraulic system. The smell of wild rosemary came to them.

11499

CSO: 1801/299

GROUND FORCES

EXERCISE IN MARCH SECURITY DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 83 (signed to press 24 Feb 83) pp 6-7

[Article by Colonel Yu. Gavva, senior departmental officer, Main Directorate of Ground Forces Combat Training: "The Squad in March Security, NCO Correspondence Instruction"]

[Text] Observing the country in the vicinity, the patrol squad advances in its assigned direction in rapid moves from one place of cover to another.

The squad leader immediately reports to the commander who has sent him out on everything which has been sighted along the route of march and upon any contact with the enemy.

The patrol squad will, as a rule, destroy any small groups of enemy troops, seize maps and other documents and continue with its mission. If it encounters a numerically superior enemy force it will take action in accordance with what the situation dictates: it will surprise the enemy with sudden fire delivered from an advantageous position and then destroy the enemy force in a resolute attack; if, however, the squad is unable to destroy the enemy on its own, it will hold its position tenaciously and support the deployment and engagement of the unit [zastava] for which it had been providing security.

from the Ground Forces Field Manual

As practical experience bears out, a daytime tactical drill exercise in this area will always stir the soldiers' interest. They will all have unlimited opportunity to prove themselves in action in the field: to demonstrate their knowledge, skill, resourcefulness, intelligence, resolve and military stratagem. With a view to maintaining a high level of competitive spirit, the leaders of the best squads will in the process of organizing socialist competition talk with each member of their squads beforehand and establish each man's optimum obligation as well as the various pairs of competitors.

As a rule, individual personal obligations will include the following points: skillfully utilize natural terrain features affording concealment while on scouting missions; make careful observations and report in a timely and effective manner what has been sighted; demonstrate perception and resourcefulness in surveying obstacles and defenses which are encountered; act boldly and resolutely in encounters with the "enemy." Since the

Exercise is being conducted at platoon level, competition will be organized between squads for best norm performance in the category "Deploy from approach march formation (from a column in the case of a squad) into battle formation."


To maintain a healthy competitive spirit, the squad leader will throughout the exercise quickly total up results after the activities in each training category have been completed.

This exercise (see plan) is conducted without, though in the vicinity of, equipment in the "dismounted drive-through" formation over a closed course, which as a rule will pass through the tactical training ground, populated areas, over bridges and through woods and ravines.

In preparing to begin activities in the first training category, the squad leader orients his men to the lay of the land, introduces them to the tactical situation and presents them their combat mission. The sergeant's operational order would typically run as follows:

"The withdrawing 'enemy' is mining the area, building log obstacles and every other possible kind of barrier along the route and at the same time advancing a reserve force as large as a battalion in the direction 'Kruglyy' [round] Forest-Romanovka-Fedorovka

1 mpp [motorized rifle platoon] will be the advance party; operating along the route 'Vysokiy' [high] Forest-Fedorovka-Romanovka-'Kruglyy' Forest, it's mission will be to conduct a reconnaissance of the terrain, protect the battalion column against a surprise 'enemy' attack and prevent 'enemy' reconnaissance from penetrating to the column.



Key: 1 - north; 2 - south; 3 - Kruglyy; 4 - military post; 5 - Vysokiy; 6 - Svetlaya Wood; 7 - Fedorovka; 8 - Karaman River; 9 - Romanovka

"Our squad will be a patrol squad; our mission is to move along the route of the advance party, protect it against surprise 'enemy' attack, locate the 'enemy' by observing and inspecting the terrain, determine his strength and make a timely report.

"Privates Ivanov and Fedorov will be scouts. Private Ivanov is the senior man. Move in the direction (here he indicates direction with reference

of terrain features). Report everything you sight to me by signal and orally. Remaining squad members will move in a single-file column.

Observers will be Private Gromov ahead and to the right, Private Ryzhov to the left and to the rear. Everyone be ready to open fire at my command. Signals and actions to take when you hear them will be.... PFC Sidorov will be my deputy."

After checking to make sure all trainees have understood the mission, the squad leader proceeds to the practical activities. Along the route he instructs his scouts and his squad in skillful exploitation of natural concealment afforded by terrain features, position finding and in observing the 'enemy' and the terrain and receives brief, precise reports on what has been sighted. If his scouts make errors, he has them repeat the procedure until all deficiencies have been eliminated.

The first training category presents no particular difficulty, so less time is devoted to it than to the others—no more than 30 minutes.

It will be to advantage to break the second training category down into separate sub-categories: procedures to follow in surveying a populated area and other local features and then upon encountering mined or contaminated sections of the route.

The most varied methodological techniques can be employed in instructing trainees in how to survey a populated area. A certain sequence should be followed, however. First scout from a distance the roofs, windows and attics of individual buildings and houses around the outskirts as well as trees and other places from where the 'enemy' could be conducting his own observations and where he could position his security.

If observation from a distance fails to turn up any signs of the 'enemy', the patrol squad will advance under concealment to the outskirts and survey the houses first from a distance, then from within the depth of the populated area. For an inspection of individual buildings the sergeant sends out more pairs of scouts, reminding them that they must exercise caution so as to avoid ambushes and booby traps. The squad then begins in advance down a street of the populated area, the squad keeping as far to one side as possible, the scouts to the other side. All personnel conduct observations and maintain themselves in readiness to engage the enemy.

If the leader notes deficiencies in execution, he repeats this point until he gets well coordinated performance from the members of his squad.

Practical exercise experience tells us that a squad will not always stop and send out scouts to survey local features. The fact is, of course, that moving up behind the advance party is the main force column, which is maintaining a speed established by the commander. So in actual combat, a patrol squad will move quickly and not spend much time on features or objectives which do not arouse suspicion. For purposes of this tactical drill exercise, however, it will be proper from the methodological point of view for the sergeant to require his men thoroughly to inspect all local features, both along the route of advance and off it.

At the same time the sergeant reminds his men that if the patrol squad spends more time checking out one site it will have to move faster to get to the next one to make up for lost time and to allow the advance party and main force column to maintain an unimpeded advance. This means that when the "dismounted drive-through" method is being employed the squad will have to cover some sections of its route at a run.

Upon receiving his scouts' report that they are approaching a "contaminated" area, the sergeant gives a warning signal and reports by radio to the platoon commander. The soldiers don their gas masks and individual protective gear. If time and circumstances permit, the leader of the patrol squad organizes a reconnaissance of the "contaminated" area and then locates and marks a passage through it. After reporting this to the platoon commander, he moves out again along the route of march and continues with his mission.

It will be to advantage to cover the third training area in the following sequence: first, action to take upon encountering small groups of "enemy" forces, then action to take upon encountering a numerically superior "enemy."

The technique to be employed in instructing the trainees remains essentially unchanged. Here, however, the sergeant gives special attention to execution with respect to norm requirements (squad deployment from column to combat formation) and works to achieve rapid dismounted movement on the part of the squad in destroying small groups of "enemy" forces under covering infantry-combat-vehicle fire. He can introduce the greatest range of variants here—everything will depend upon the situation created in the course of the exercise.

The last element of the exercise—encountering a numerically superior "enemy"—requires that the sergeant be able skillfully to exploit the natural concealment potential afforded by local terrain features, move his squad under concealment to an advantageous position and then select and organize preparation of firing positions. After assigning the tactical problems for the exercise, he instructs his men in how to organize an unyielding defense of the position they have occupied so as to be able to support the deployment and well-organized engagement of the enemy of the advance party.

In concluding the exercise, the squad leader conducts a brief critique. He evaluates the performance of each member of the squad and points out how to eliminate deficiencies which have been identified. After having given his evaluations, the sergeant sets up the results achieved in fulfillment of socialist obligations which have been undertaken and announces the winners.

PLAN

"PLAN AND APPROVED"

Lt. Petrov, commander,

1 MRP

" " (month) 1983

for tactical drill exercise for tactical training with
1 squad, 1 MRP.

SUBJECT: No 9, exercise 1. The squad in march security.
TRAINING OBJECTIVES: develop in personnel the ability to
act quickly and expertly as a patrol squad; improve their
skills in performing the duties of observers and scouts;
develop good moral-psychological qualities in personnel.
LOCATION: tactical training ground and adjacent area.
INSTRUCTIONAL REFERENCES: Ground Forces Field Manual,
Part 3; Tactical Training Methods for the Individual
Soldier, Squad and Motorized Rifle Platoon; Collected
Norms for Ground Forces Combat Training.

TRAINING EQUIPMENT: 2 antitank training mines; 20 blank cartridges; 1 mine detector and probe; 1 pair binoculars; 1 VPKhR chemical agent detector; 3 sets assorted markers; 2 pair flags

Training category and time	Leader	Trainees
Exercise organization - - 5 min	I check squad's readiness for exercise. I announce the subject matter, objectives and training categories to be covered.	Develop thorough understanding of exercise objectives and training categories to be covered
1. Patrol squad march procedures - 30 min	I announce order of forming up for operation as patrol squad. I give instruction concerning squad formation and procedures to be followed on the march and in conducting observations. I introduce squad to tactical situation. I instruct squad in how to achieve well-coordinated performance in all training categories. I conduct a brief critique.	Personnel act as scouts and observers, practice making brief reports on what they have sight. In case of deficiencies, this is repeated. These actions are then reaccomplished in combination with exploitation of natural concealment afforded by local terrain features.
2. Procedures to follow in surveying populated areas, in passing through canyons and passes, over bridges and other narrow places and upon encountering mined or contaminated sections of march route - - 65 min.	I explain methods and procedures to employ in surveying local features. I give instruction in procedures to follow in surveying populated areas: passing through narrow places and over bridges and upon encountering mined or contaminated areas. I give instruction and integrate all elements studied with the background of the tactical situation. Brief critique.	Learn procedures to employ in surveying terrain. Practice surveying populated area, bridges, canyons, wooded areas and action to take upon encountering mined or contaminated areas. Eliminate deficiencies in each area by repeated performance. Return to initial position, repeat exercise, this time integrating all elements studied against the background of the tactical situation.

to take upon
encountering small groups
of "enemy" forces, numeri-
cally superior "enemy"
forces.

I explain and demonstrate pro-
cedures scouts and squad follow
upon contact with small groups
of "enemy" forces and then with
a numerically superior "enemy."
I drill scouts and squad in the
elements of destroying (captur-
ing a small group, in actions
to take in encounters with a
numerically superior "enemy"
and then in seizing and hold-
ing an advantageous line.
I then discuss these actions as
integrated with the given back-
ground tactical situation.

Learn procedures to
follow upon making con-
tact with the "enemy."
Drill in elements of
conducting reconnaissance
against the "enemy using
natural concealment of-
fered by the terrain and
reporting results of ob-
servations.
Destroy (capture) a group
of "enemy" forces in a
rapid surprise attack.
Accomplish tactical
training norm.
Upon making contact with
numerically superior
"enemy" learn elements
of occupying and prepar-
ing advantageous posi-
tion; driver learns how
to select position for
infantry combat vehicle
(APC).
Integrated drill cover-
ing all these areas in
context of overall tac-
tical situation.

Exercise critique-
- 5 min

I recall the subject matter
the exercise was to have
covered and the training
objective.
I point out basic performance
deficiencies and give assign-
ment to eliminate them.
I tot up results of performance
in fulfillment of socialist
obligations undertaken and
evaluate the performance of
each trainee.

Sergeant FOMIN ,
Squad leader,
1 squad

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5963
CSO: 1801/318

GROUND FORCES

NEED FOR FIRE CONTROL TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 83 (signed to press 24 Feb 83) pp 8-9

[Article by ZNAMENOSSETS correspondent Major V. Khoreshko: "It's Not Enough To Be a Rifleman..., Tactical Fire Training"]

[Text] At the signal to dismount the turret hatches and the rear doors for the assault squads flew open as if manipulated by a single hand. The assault troops poured out of their infantry combat vehicles on the move. The sergeants, central figures in the rapidly forming links of this fighting chain, led their men into the attack.

A number of targets appeared in the operational direction assigned to Guards Sergeant L. Lyutarevich's squad. The leader, Guards Sniper Private V. Ivanov, Guards Machine-gunner Private Sh. Ruzayev and other riflemen immediately opened fire. Giving no thought to sparing ammunition, they riddled the closest, most clearly visible targets--a group of infantry. But a more dangerous target, although one not so readily spotted--an antitank rocket launcher, remained untouched. Had they been in actual combat, these soldiers could have been left without their combat vehicle or the tank up ahead of them. So it was no coincidence that the exercise director announced that their BMP [infantry combat vehicle] had been "put out of action."

These motorized riflemen would also have suffered unjustifiable losses in repulsing an "enemy" counterattack. The sergeant gave them a loud warning that a tank and infantry men had been sighted up ahead of the squad. But he gave no more. The grenade launcher operator, Guards Private K. Botabekov, however, needed a precise command from his sergeant which would have included a range setting and an aiming point. So in his first combat exercise the soldier got confused and failed to hit the tank.

The sergeant himself fired accurately, however, and destroyed a number of silhouette targets. But it was as if he had forgotten that in his hands he had not just his own assault rifle, but an entire squad as well, a squad with a variety of weapons whose power when it was needed had to be directed and combined. Lyutarevich, however, acting like one of the rank-and-file riflemen, had left it up to his men themselves to analyze their targets and decide on the weapon to use to destroy them.

In merely passing on signals coming in from the platoon commander, the sergeant was essentially directing only the movement of his soldiers. He would not have been required, of course, to give a continuous flow of commands to destroy targets. The fire control process does, after all, assume a certain amount of independence on the part of

the individual soldier. He is to make observations of the battlefield and respond immediately to any "enemy" action. It is nevertheless upon the leader himself which will depend the effectiveness with which the potential of the firepower and the weapons entrusted to him is exploited.

Targets left undestroyed along the route of the attacking squad stood as graphic evidence of the oversights of its leader. I wanted to find out why it was that Lyutarevich, and not Lyutarevich alone by the way, had been unable to handle his fire-control responsibilities—responsibilities constituting the leader's most important duties in combat.

I began to see things more clearly after I had had a chance to observe a number of exercises. It turned out that here in this company it was not considered necessary to set up on each firing exercise a training site to be used for fire-control practice. No attention is given to training in this area on tactical exercises either.

At company level an entirely different approach is taken to the task of improving the sergeants' skills in commanding the BMP crews. They don't tolerate any slip-ups here. But the fact is that experience in squad fire control is just as essential to a sergeant as an ability to execute fire missions when it comes to firing the powerful weapons on the BMP. So why is it that the company gives such obvious preference to the latter?

There is indeed an explanation for this attitude. The fact is that the fire coordination of a BMP crew is evaluated in tests. In other words, the overall evaluation a subunit [podrazdeleniye] receives for its fire training will to a great extent depend upon the coordinated performances of the "spetsy", the term used to refer to the BMP commander, the gunner-operator and the driver, all proficiency rated personnel. The state of the fire training of the so-called "assault team" ["desant"], however, is judged on the basis of a sum of individual performance ratings. Nor do ratings achieved in field firing or in tactical exercises involving field firing provide any full picture of the ability of a group of riflemen to fire as a squad. There will, moreover, be instances in which an officer who is gunning for a high target-destruction percentage will take over the fire-control responsibilities for both a platoon and a squad. In doing so, of course, he does a disservice to the young NCO. If he becomes accustomed to this kind of intervention he will also become less concerned about the many aspects of his own command training and preparation in the hope that when things get difficult in combat some expert officer will come to his rescue.

At company level the thinking obviously is that if a sergeant is in command of a dismounted formation, he will be where people can keep an eye on him, where he can always be corrected. But would it not be here that we find a cause contributing to the tendency to undervalue the training of a sergeant as the leader of a squad of motorized riflemen?

To hear company officers here tell it, in the course of everyday training oversights like this are somehow to be considered even inevitable. The sergeant can't possibly do all this single-handedly, achieve good crew fire coordination simultaneously with mutual comprehension of the combat situation in the squad.

I heard something similar from Guards Sergeant L. Lyutarevich as well. In the course of any given session of marksmanship training he will seldom see his squad together as a unit. For the fact is that his snipers, grenade launcher operators and machine

gunners practice separately at training sites set up for individual categories of trainee and specialty. The situation is such that he works more at improving his skills as a BMP commander and practices most frequently executing missions on the moving target gunnery range together with his gunner-operator and driver. We can now understand what Lyutarevich means when he confesses:

"I feel much more sure of myself in the BMP than I do out on the assault line."

The command process is much more complex for the sergeant nowadays; in the course of battle he has to command, simultaneously or alternately, two separate subunits, as it were: his BMP crew and his squad. This, however, is by no means to say that in dividing his attention during exercises between his "spetsy" and his "assault team" the sergeant is in no position to eliminate a certain bias in his command training. The practical experience accumulated by our best subunits demonstrates that with proper organization of his combat training program a sergeant will equally solid skills in commanding both his squad and his crew. This is precisely the way things have worked out for sergeants of the "outstanding"-rated motorized rifle company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Yamkovoy. Here, for example, is how squad leader Guards Sergeant A. Benediktov handles the problem which Guards Sergeant L. Lyutarevich finds almost hopelessly insoluble. In the course of every exercise out on the fire training ground, Benediktov takes maximum advantage of the training site where they practice target reconnaissance by observation, range finding and target indication to work together with his men on the execution of fire missions. Depending upon what kind of exercise is involved, this drill will alternate between firing with the BMP weapon and small arms firing.

The last half-hour of marksmanship training will also be devoted to the problem of coordinating subunit fire. All training sites are combined for this purpose. Sergeants learn how effectively to employ both organizational and attached weapons in a variety of combat situations.

After taking their positions either in a trench or the BMP, these motorized rifle troops wait for the targets to come up; they locate them, determine their ranges and the sequence in which they should be destroyed and report to the squad leader. In directing squad fire, the sergeant evaluates the targets in terms of their relative importance, decides upon the type of weapon to be employed in destroying them, determines fire concentration, allocates fire missions and makes corrections. The troops learn not to "contain" themselves within their own sector of fire alone, but rather to remain alert for situations requiring mutual fire support as well.

In instructing his men, Benediktov and the other sergeants in the company make extensive use of simulators and other training equipment. To practice coordinating fire with his gunner-operator, Guards Private A. Denisov, for example, he has frequently gone to the motion-picture simulator. Using the motion picture equipment and accompanying sound effects, he can create the illusion of actual combat in the room. Observing the situation on the screen through a special instrument, the gunner-operator locates his targets and reports initial settings for destroying them. At the same time, the squad leader practices his fire-control skills.

Both in the classroom and during independent study time Guards Sergeant Benediktov finds opportunities to work together with his men on problems involving the application of firing regulations. It has also become company practice to conduct quickie tactical drills of a sort in which under the direction of a deputy platoon commander

in accordance with situations he will assign, the squad leaders practice giving orders, assign combat missions and solve problems involving the organization of fire and cooperation among their men.

Group exercises in the field and tactical drills both contribute greatly to improved fire-control skills. Sergeants used to use range cards only in defensive exercises. Now they have to use them in organizing offensive actions as well. In addition to the various landmarks, they indicate on the cards the line the "enemy's" forward defense line (FEBA) runs along, "enemy" targets actually identified and the squad's direction of attack. This kind of drill helps these motorized rifle troops develop a clearer understanding of their mission and of procedures to be employed in conducting observations and delivering fire and helps their squad leaders achieve optimum distribution of fire among the important targets and skillfully control this fire as the action proceeds.

In a word, not only the officers of this outstanding company, but the sergeants themselves as well concern themselves with acquiring solid skills in combat operational organization and subunit control. They never lose sight of the fact that in combat it is not enough for a commander, a squad leader simply to be a good marksman. He must be able in any situation to utilize all types of squad weapons with maximum effectiveness.

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PSD: 1801/318

AIR DEFENSE FORCES

NEED FOR COORDINATION IN COMBAT STRESSED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 83 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Leverash, combat pilot 1st class, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "Through An Air Defense Zone, New Weapons and Tactics"]

[Text] The tactical flight exercise was in full swing when the weather suddenly made its own corrections to the commander's decision to negotiate the "enemy's" air defense zone. Several layers of low clouds had now made it impossible to fly to the target in tight combat formations. The aircraft were now streaking singly to their objectives. Each one had to act independently.

As a rule, bombers only rarely attack singly. They operate for the most part in a group formation, flying virtually wing tip to wing tip. It is easier to negotiate an air defense zone like this, while a bombing attack is more effective in this instance as well. But this what could be referred to as a classical formation has its drawbacks, too. The most important one, in my view, is that it entails a gradual erosion of the initiative of the wingmen in the group. They become so accustomed to acting upon command from the leader that any unanticipated departure from a plan or from a standard procedure will occasionally put them at a loss. They then become easy target for the "enemy."

An unanticipated situation arising in the course of one of the exercises bore out the truth of this. Squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel V. Zaytsev, combat pilot 1st class, had led groups of bombers on missions to destroy targets no few times. Able to take his crews the safest possible way through "enemy" air defense zones, he is always working to hone his tactical skills and make skillful use of accumulated experience for his own purposes. He has gained a solid reputation as a competent commander, one capable of taking initiative, and a daring and fearless combat pilot. On this occasion, too, Lieutenant Colonel Zaytsev emerged the victor from an encounter with the "enemy." Correctly calculating that because of the low ceiling the "enemy" would not be expecting the bombers to come in at a low altitude, but rather would be concentrating his attention primarily upon the medium and high altitudes, Zaytsev selected a route for his group taking advantage of the local terrain features. Despite the fact that his crews were coming in singly, not one "enemy" antiaircraft missile installation was able to prevent them from accomplishing their combat mission. And when I as the range flight director flew over the area where the bombers had been operating in a helicopter I was able to see for myself how precise and effective their attack had been. Not only were all the area targets destroyed, but all the individual point targets as well. For this performance the squadron received a high rating.

The performance of the crews commanded by Captains N. Feoktistov and P. Morozov presents a sharp contrast to that turned in by the first group of bombers. Upon being ordered to operate individually, these pilots proved to be at something of a loss. They gave no particular thought to the tactics and methods to be employed in negotiating the "enemy's" air defenses. By flying in straight lines they demonstrated to the "enemy" that they had no intention of employing any evasive antimissile maneuvers. It won't make any difference, they said, the "enemy's" only hypothetical in this instance anyway; he's not going to shoot you down.

From my position in the range tower I could clearly see the objectives of this attack as well as the positions of the "enemy's" air defense sites. The crews manning these antiaircraft missile installations had been alerted long before Feoktistov's and Morozov's crews began their attack. The picture was now clear—the early-warning radar stations had gotten a fix on the bombers. So by the time the aircraft approached the range, the "enemy" was able to fire on them a number of times.

During the final phase of their flight the pilots were nevertheless able to bomb their targets, and in fact with results that weren't all that bad. The unit [chast'] commander, however, did the right thing in giving them low ratings. During the exercise critique he put special emphasis on the fact that these pilots' passivity in negotiating the "enemy's" air defense zone had made it impossible for the motorized rifle forces, in support of whom the air strike had been planned in the first place, to develop their attack. The battle on the ground turned into a protracted affair. We could clearly see here the importance effective cooperation between subunits [podrazdeleniye] of different branches of the service has on the battlefield.

The passivity these aviators displayed came as no coincidence. In preparing our men for a flight mission, we aviation subunit commanders unfortunately do not always take full account of the interests of the motorized rifle troops and the tankers. But even if this is true, it isn't true, I must say, because that's the way we want things. One of the reasons is an inadequate knowledge of the principles governing combined-arms operations and poor comprehension of the concept involved and then of operations the ground forces actually undertake. Not all our pilots make a conscientious effort to study the "enemy's" air defense systems. Some are limited by a purely rote learning of the tactical-technical data on antiaircraft systems, in the process giving no attention to combat operational tactics.

The failures which fell the lot of individual crews during this exercise provided the material for serious discussion by the unit's methods council. It was mentioned on this occasion that there were some officers in the regiment who were always able to accomplish their combat training mission successfully. All crews in the flight commanded until recently by Major A. Selyavko, combat 1st class, for example, have proven highly effective in action against "enemy" air defenses and are able to destroy ground targets with high rates of probability. We directorate officers have repeatedly referred to the flight's success in the course of postflight critiques, but we have unfortunately neglected to generalize the practical experience it has accumulated and make it another of the assets held in common by all aviators in the regiment.

The methods council decided to take a close look at the way the commander of this outstanding flight, Major A. Selyavko, goes about his job. It became clear that Selyavko relies primarily upon timely, comprehensive, well-planned preparation of his men for each and every mission they undertake. He makes skillful use of such staple training methods as the "quickie" tactical problem; he plans these problem exercises carefully,

prepares himself thoroughly for them and always tries to relate the point of his tactical problem to the missions ahead of the flight or dictated by the planned schedule. In the course of these exercises Selyavko creates truly instructive situations and then adds complicating factors, all the time encouraging his men to work out their own independent versions of the best way to penetrate to their objectives. After listening to a response to the problem he has posed, the flight commander then requires other pilots and navigators to make their own contributions to it and voice their opinions, drawing in the process upon examples from practical experience to support their views. This kind of exercise is an interesting one; it helps aviators develop their tactical thinking and encourages them to display initiative in actual combat.

It has been recommended that subunit commanders adopt this innovation in their own combat training programs. At this point, however, we have run up against instances of a formalistic approach to the training process. The people in Captain Feoktistov's flight, for example, thought it was going to be a simple matter to organize and conduct any type of tactical problem exercise. It would be enough, they said, to pick your exercise site, make up your list of problems and then present the literature. Then if an aviator can answer the test questions correctly he is as ready as he can be for the upcoming flights. This kind of approach, of course, made it difficult to insure that the aviators' flying skills represented an organic combination of superior pilot technique, solid theoretical knowledge and thorough mastery of tactical skills. So it came as no surprise when the flight got low ratings during its test.

This illustration demonstrates that before we begin to teach our rank-and-file pilots the difficult art of penetrating "enemy" air defense zones we must first give attention to the task of improving the methodological mastery of our flight commanders. We have begun to hold regular seminars for them as well as demonstration exercises and group exercises in which air situations are modeled. Officers S. Giatsintov, Yu. Dem'yanov and V. Shvetchikhin, all experienced pilots, are in charge of this training. With the objective of making flight commanders more responsible for the state of the combat skills of their men, they have proposed that we adopt a different approach to the evaluation of flight mission performance. Formerly, for example, it was determined whether or not a pilot had successfully penetrated an "enemy" air defense zone on the basis of recording and monitoring data on his execution of the tactical maneuvers involved. But this kind of evaluation was, of course, highly hypothetical, what with the fact that the monitoring equipment gives information about particular evolutions of a combat aircraft but not about their effectiveness with combat employment of its missile system. Everybody was aware of all this and...they continued to close their eyes to the patent oversimplification it represented. This system of evaluation ultimately began to dampen the enthusiasm of our combat aviators and reduced their desire to try to improve their combat and tactical skills.

After discussing steps to take to deal with these weaknesses in the combat training program, the regiment's communists presented the following proposal for consideration by the regimental command: to insure rigorous, objective monitoring of performance results from efforts to penetrate an air defense zone, it should assign its own representative to observe an exercise from one of the air defense installations involved. In the course of the flights he can observe the aviators' performance on the anti-aircraft defense system radar screens. If the anti-aircraft people "shoot down" an aircraft, a careful study can then be made of what caused the pilot to make his mistake. This information is then disseminated to everyone in the air regiment. This should be accompanied by a thorough critique of the performance involved and the preparation of recommendations to be tested in the course of subsequent flights.

The final test of the winter training period showed that the combat training the bomber pilots had undergone without the weak spots and without the oversimplification had helped improve their mastery of tactical skills. The best confirmation of this comes from the increasing number of "complaints" we are getting from our neighbors in the antiaircraft defense positions about the growing difficulty they are having in intercepting their air targets. But as far as we ourselves are concerned, we don't believe we have yet done all we can to improve our ability to penetrate "enemy" air defense zones, and we will be giving this the most concentrated attention during the summer training period.

8903

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AIR DEFENSE FORCES

ZU-23 AUTOMATIC ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 83 (signed to press 24 Feb 83) pp 12-13

[Article by Colonel Engineer V. Knyaz'kov: "The Antiaircraft Gun, Weapons and Equipment for the New Soldier"]

[Text] An airborne assault subunit has been assigned the mission of destroying a concentration of the "enemy's" troops and equipment deep in his rear. The green overhead light comes on, then the command "Go!" The parachute "buds" burst open in the sky below....

What weapons did the airborne soldier take with him when he jumped from an aircraft during the Great Patriotic War? An assault rifle, grenades and an assault knife. That's all. But cargo platforms now gently brought a variety of weapons and equipment to the ground: self-propelled artillery, missile launchers and airborne assault vehicles. Antiaircraft guns were also landed and expertly positioned. "Enemy" helicopter had only to show themselves beyond the edge of the forest to find themselves on the receiving end of an intense hail of antiaircraft fire. This was the 23-mm ZU-23 twin mount antiaircraft gun opening fire.

What kind of a weapon is this? Specialists give a brief but accurate definition: the ZU-23 is a powerful weapon for use against aerial targets at ranges up to 2500 m and altitudes as high as 1500 m and is intended for the air defense of airborne assault forces. The characteristics of this gun, however, are such that it can be successfully employed against lightly armored ground targets and fire positions at ranges up to 2000 m as well as against "enemy" personnel. The weapon can deliver all-around fire to both aerial and ground targets. This capability is very important for today's combined arms operations.

The combat capabilities of the ZU-23 permitting it to play such a great variety of roles are built into it at the design stage, of course. The basic components of the ZU-23 are its two 23-mm automatic guns (right and left), which are of identical design and differ only in components of the belt feed mechanism. Each automatic gun consists of a barrel, receiver, breechblock carrier, breechblock and feed, release and return mechanisms. Both guns are secured to the cradle. The top carriage, platform with wheel and axle assembly and elevating, traversing and equilibrator mechanisms serve to aim the gun at its targets and for transporting it.

The mechanisms of these automatic guns are so sophisticated as to make possible a truly furious rate of fire—as many as 2000 rounds per minute! We have to keep in mind, now, that this is not a machine gun either, but rather a 23-mm gun whose shell weighs almost 200 g and has an initial velocity of 970 m/s. This high rate of fire, however, is dictated by the basic purpose for which the gun was designed, that is, to destroy aerial targets flying at speeds up to 300 m/s.

Now any air attack will, as a rule, be of very brief duration. And it would be naive to assume that enemy aircraft or helicopters are going to be flying like they were on parade. They will be maneuvering in both course and altitude and changing speeds. That's why the experts designed the ZU-23 in accordance with the "hunting" principle. What does this mean? Let's recall, now, that a hunter isn't going to kill a duck on the wing with a bullet—his efforts would be to no avail. He's going to use a shell filled with shot and, more frequently than not, fire them with a double-barreled gun to boot. So with this in mind, the design specialists draw certain conclusions, namely, that an antiaircraft weapon must have a high rate of fire, more than one barrel when possible and accurate and rapid control.

The fact is, of course, that if every antiaircraft shell hit its target, precisely 1000 shells would be required to destroy 1000 enemy aircraft. But that's not the way things are. And that's why designers have to solve the difficult engineering problem of bringing two moving bodies, a shell and a target, together in space. The problem is made more difficult by the fact that the shell and the target are moving at different speeds and at different angles.




It will not become clear why the ZU-23 has two automatic guns, both capable of high rates of fire. Think about this: both barrels can "throw" as many as 33 shells a second at a target. In the context of the "hunting" principle, this would amount to a unique "shot shell" weighing more than 6 kg!

Other characteristics of this weapon are of interest as well. It is capable of firing straight up into the air, what with the fact that its angle of elevation can go as high as 90 degrees. It is also capable of destroying aerial targets approaching from any direction since its total traverse is unlimited. Its elevating and traversing mechanisms are an engineering success. Suffice it to point out that it can be laid for direction at a rate of 60 degrees per second, that is, its guns can be "thrown around" in the opposite direction within three seconds!

Now briefly about the ammunition the ZU-23 uses. The ZU-23 fires two types of artillery round: a fixed round with a high-explosive fragmentation shell and a fixed round with an armor piercing-tracer shell. Let us point out here that these fixed rounds are fed to the automatic guns on metal belts, each of which holds 50 rounds.

The ZU-23 is equipped with an automatic antiaircraft sight to aim it at its targets. This is what solves the problem of determining the point at which the shell will meet its target when the weapon is being fired at the enemy either on the ground or in the air. But certain items of data have to be input into the sight before it can perform this function: the course and speed of the target and the distance to it.

Let us now look at the ZU-23 is employed in actual combat operations. Let's assume that the twin mount is travelling and that at some point the command is given to open fire on attacking enemy aircraft. Here is where we first see some of the advantages



APP. 10 ILLUSTRATIONS OF ZU-23 23-mm TWIN MOUNT:

1 - automatic guns; 2 - cradle; 3 - elevating mechanism; 4 - collimator; 5 - ground target sight; 6 - automatic antiaircraft sight; 7 - equilibrator; 8 - manual trigger; 9 - platform; 10 - support bracket; 11 - hand brake for rotating component; 12 - traversing mechanism; 13 - top carriage; 14 - jack; 15 - travelling safety lock on tipping component; 16 - lever for brake on tipping component; 17 - pedal for foot brake on rotating component; 18 - trigger pedal; 19 - ammunition box; 20 - mechanism for reloading automatic gun; 21 - reloader lever; 22 - cartridge case deflector; 23 - cover for spare parts, instruments and accessories storage. A - cartridge with OFZT [high-explosive incendiary tracer] shell; B - cartridge with BZT [armor-piercing incendiary shell with tracer] shell. 24 - fuze; 25 - explosive charge; 26 - shell; 27 - driving band; 28 - tracer; 29 - case; 30 - powder; 31 - No. 3 igniter pellet; 32 - ballistic cap; 33 - incendiary charge.

of this weapon. There is now virtually no need at all to take the time to select and prepare a firing position. The ZU-23 can take up a position almost anywhere it happens to be provided the area is at least relatively level. The wheels rotate up and to the sides, the mount then resting directly on ground supported by the platform jacks.

And how long does it take to get from its travelling position into a firing position? The bare minimum. Our designers took particular pains with this. It can be reported that a well-trained crew can move the weapon from a travelling position into its firing position in literally in the time it takes to draw a breath, that is, within some 15-20 s, 35-40 s to return it to the travelling position.

There is one particularly important feature of the practical combat employment of this antiaircraft weapon: it doesn't have to come to the halt before opening fire on an aerial target. The crew can fire from the march while the ZU-23 is towed in a trailer behind a vehicle. This feature takes on exceptional importance when we stop to consider how important the time element is in modern-day warfare.

The weapon is served by its crew. There are five men to a crew. The senior man, of course, is the chief. The others include the layer, the sightsetter and the right and left loaders.

The chief's job is to keep track of a target in the air. This is no easy thing to do. He has visually to estimate the input data, which the sightsetter immediately enters into the corresponding sight mechanisms.

As the firing continues the chief will be continually giving corrections for the course and range of the target. The layer performs his normal role. By operating the aiming mechanisms, he keeps the cross hairs of the collimator on the target. He is also responsible for the actual firing of the weapon, which he does by pressing the trigger pedal.

To maintain continuous fire, both loaders must maintain consistency and rhythm in replacing ammunition boxes on both guns. This is a fairly simple operation, but an important one nevertheless. The fact is that each ammunition box with its cartridge belt weighs more than two pounds (35.5 kg to be exact). So loaders have to be men of considerable physical strength and endurance to be able expertly to "juggle" more than just

one or two of these heavy boxes during periods of intensive firing. And time norm for changing ammunition boxes is a fairly rigorous one, too, by the way—a loader has no more than 5-10 s!

During such periods of intensive fire the barrels will inevitably overheat, but there is a certain maximum permissible temperature to be observed. What is to be done when this maximum is reached? Cease firing and wait for the barrels to cool off? No, the weapon has been designed to permit the barrels to be quickly changed when they overheat. All the components involved here have been designed such that under field conditions a crew can change a barrel in something like 15-20 s.

Now a few words about transportation. The ZU-23 can be easily transported "on the hook" behind a vehicle, what with the fact that together with its covers and ammunition boxes, the weapon weighs less than a ton in its travelling configuration. It can be towed at a maximum permissible speed of 70 km/h. Since the mount's wheel and axle assembly has been equipped with torsion spring suspension, it can be transported even over bad roads at speeds up to 20 km/h.

So the ZU-23 23-mm twin mount offers high combat and tactical-technical characteristics making it possible successfully to take on suddenly appearing and rapid moving targets.

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8963

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LOGISTIC SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

GAS PIPELINE-LAYING EXERCISE EVALUATED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 83 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel I. Zvenov with commentary by Lieutenant General G. Pastukhovskiy, district chief of rear services and deputy commander for rear services, Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "The Line to the Forward Edge, Report and Commentary"]

[Text] In the course of a final special tactical exercise, a battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel N. Chudin was assigned the mission executing a night march, advance to certain point and then lay a pipeline several kilometers long from there to the forward edge to carry fuel to the advancing subunits [podrazdeleniye].

The job was going to be difficult and laborious. The rugged terrain, the bad roads, the time constraints—all these factors were going to require great skill on the part of these specialists, well-coordinate actions and the exertion of great physical and moral strength.

Upon completing their march, the troops began assembling the pipeline at daybreak in a depression overgrown with brush. Two hours later they had already progressed far beyond the depression and taken the line across a number of roads and ravines. With each extension of the line, Major Engineer V. Tkachev checked the quality of the work the men were doing in line up and joining the sections of pipe. At periodic intervals he radioed his reports to battalion headquarters, where specialists marked the growth of the line on a topographical map and a flow chart.

Complete reliability and tight seals between the sections of pipe are the most important measure of the skills of these specialists and the condition of the complex equipment involved. But the speed with which they can lay the line is every bit as important. There can be no interruptions in the troops' fuel supply. So led by Senior Lieutenant V. Litvinenko, Senior Warrant Officer P. Khilyuk and Sergeant A. Tsirkunov, these specialists work without a break, putting forth maximum effort all the while.

At the next designated point, where the line runs closest to a road, special machines with a new batch of pipe were already waiting for the layers. The troops quickly took over the load. Work on assembling the line then resumed at its former furious pace.

Somewhere up ahead, not far from the forward edge, other subunits of the battalion are building and readying field pumping stations and fuel depots for operation. The

layers have also to work with the possibility of "enemy" interference—how many times have the aircraft already appeared over the horizon and here they come again. The battalion commander orders a smoke screen laid over objects along the line.

The troops don their individual protective gear. The work continues.

Tens of difficult kilometers have now been covered, field refueling points set up and the pipeline seals checked for tightness. Emergency repair teams are positioned along the entire length of the line and provisions made for pipeline security and defense. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chudin, gives the command:

"Switch on the pumping stations!"

The pipeline goes into operation. Within only a few minutes, the tanks and infantry combat vehicles, now refueled, head out once again for the forward edge. More vehicles and equipment then come in to take their places at the pumps.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL G. PASTUKHOVSKIY, district chief of rear services and Red Banner Carpathian Military District deputy commander for rear services, comments below on the final special tactical exercise performance of the troops of this pipeline battalion.

Field trunk pipelines are the most important means we have of transporting fuel and lubricants to our troops over long distances. The demands placed upon our pipeline troops are exacting. Among other things, a pipeline has to be laid fast enough to keep up with the advancing forces despite the continuous effects of enemy action.

The state of training of our personnel, the mobility and survivability of rear units [chast'] and subunits and the reliability with which they can provide our fighting troops with what they need can, of course, be best checked in the field. The special tactical exercise we are looking at here was no exception in this respect. The battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Chudin demonstrated good skill.

Despite the difficulties presented by the course the pipeline was required to take and the various tactical problems involving "enemy" air attacks and his employment of weapons of mass destruction, attacks by commando groups and situations in which individual components of the pipeline as well as a number of personnel got put out of action, fuel for the motorized rifle, tank, artillery and other subunits was available within only a short time.

At the same time, however, I would like here to raise a question which goes beyond the battalion and the exercise we are looking at. What I have in mind here is the interaction between rear and front-line subunits during the mass-scale refueling of combat vehicles in the field. Exercises have demonstrated that some commanders have yet to give careful thought to the best, up-to-date refueling methods; they think of it as something that concerns only rear services specialists and do not conduct exercises in which the latter participate. Because they do not possess the skills required to direct column traffic in the vicinity of the refueling point, some subunit commanders in a number of instances demonstrated a lack of confidence in this situation. Drivers have always performed efficiently. They have occasionally maneuvered their combat vehicles improperly in approaching the refueling lines and caused traffic jams as a result.

On the whole, however, the special tactical exercise conducted at the close of the winter training period proved a serious test of the combat maturity of both the pipeline troops and personnel of subunits of other branches of the service, a test which they passed successfully, making at the same time an important contribution to the effort to fulfill obligations undertaken in competition.

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LOGISTIC SERVICE AND SPECIAL TROOPS

WINTER STORAGE OF FOOD SUPPLIES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 83 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel-Engineer A. Anuchkin, chief of food services, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Lessons for the Future, From the Fund of Experience in Storing Winter Supplies"]

[Text] Spring is a special time for food service personnel. For it is precisely during this period, the period in which they prepare their storage facilities to receive the fruits of the coming harvest, that they look at the results of their winter storage of supplies from the past year, which gives them an opportunity to learn some lessons for the future.

It should be pointed out that most of the district's food storage facilities saw natural losses of potatoes and vegetables amounting to less than half the normal. But these general figures, of course, have to be seen as representing both the achievements of some of our personnel and the distressing mistakes of others.

I recently had occasion to visit the food storage facility where Warrant Officer I. Priplod is chief of operation. I've known him for over five years now; Ivan Dmitriyevich's first concern has always been the conditions at his facility. It is a model of cleanliness and order. It's nice to see both the chief himself and his assistants in their white coats. Thanks to the good management here and the responsible attitudes toward the operation on the part of the personnel involved, the facility has been able to achieve a 100-percent potato and vegetable preservation rate. Our capricious Central Asian winter is behind us now. But the vegetable storage facility here still has the full assortment of produce on hand that it needs.

These high figures are by no means a coincidence. They are the result of the painstaking efforts which began way back last fall when the produce was first being brought in for winter storage. Particular attention was given to preparing the potatoes for storage. To stop the natural processes occurring within the tubers and prevent them from sprouting, storage workers would first keep each load for several days in a covered, well-ventilated place. They then sorted the potatoes; the medium-size ones in good condition went into containers for storage until spring. The large ones and those which had been damaged by the machines were set aside to be used first. Individual storage areas were closely monitored to insure the maintenance of proper microclimatic conditions. Skillful use is made at this point of what is referred to as forced ventilation; both temperature and humidity were checked regularly. These measures included

checks on the temperature inside the piles of potatoes themselves at least twice a week. These efforts were repaid with interest in the form of waste-free produce storage.

The lessons of the winter demonstrate that it is not at all difficult to store a harvest with only minimal losses if personnel observe good processing and handling discipline and make practical use of up-to-date produce storage methods. Many units within the district are doing precisely this. In places which have a hot climate, for example, potatoes are stored in concrete bins which are partly underground and equipped with heat-insulated doors. Then on top of that they install evaporative coolers inside the storage areas themselves and freon units outside to lower the temperature.

Each passing year sees advances made in vegetable storage methods. Practical experience accumulated by our best specialists shows that carrots, for example, keep their food value best if they are stored in paper or polyethylene bags stacked in several rows on metal shelves. They do not suffer weight loss when they are stored this way, either. Perforated boxes have proven irreplaceable for storing onions, while fresh cabbage is best hung in darkened areas after first being dusted with chalk.

In a word, our district food service personnel dispose of a rich arsenal of means and methods permitting them to achieve good results in storing food supplies for the winter. I would like to point out, however, that no matter how advanced our food-storage methods, the really decisive factor here is a conscientious, businesslike attitude toward his responsibilities on the part of each food service worker. An inspection recently conducted in the unit where Lieutenant N. Pil'gun heads the food service revealed substantial produce losses. No wonder: potatoes and vegetables had been thrown together in the same heap, the temperature in the vegetable storage facility was eight degrees too high according to the norm and the air vents were obstructed. It was even revealed that as far back as last fall, when the potatoes were being laid in for the winter, they were not dried or sorted and were dumped randomly in unprepared bins and containers.

This kind of neglect and mismanagement did not go unpunished, of course. Lieutenant N. Pil'gun received a stiff fine. The chief of the storage facility, Warrant Officer S. Teteryatnik, was discharged from the army. But were these two in fact the only ones guilty of mismanagement here?

The unit commander and his deputies, individuals responsible for seeing to proper organization of operations involved in supplying and feeding the troops, had given inadequate attention to food service operations and the organization of produce storage. Lieutenant N. Pil'gun, for example, had repeatedly turned for assistance to Lieutenant Colonel S. Sadvokasov. But things never got beyond promises of transportation and personnel. And the produce losses were the result.

It was pointed out at the 26th Party Congress that the volumes of produce our agriculture is growing today are already sufficient to make for substantial improvement in the country's supplies of many kinds of foodstuffs and that the slow increases in consumption of these foods was to be explained primarily by produce losses. So it was emphasized at the congress that while continuing to increase our production of fruit and vegetables, we must also improve our transportation, storage and processing of this produce. It is entirely obvious that this is an urgent problem for the army as well.

Work on the preparation of our food storage facilities to take in produce from the coming harvest is now in full swing. Facilities are being put in order, storage areas dried out and the condition of roofs, ceilings and insulation checked. It is very important that we keep our storage facilities in exemplary condition so as to be able to preserve every last kilogram of potatoes, vegetables and other produce for our servicemen.

8963

CSO: 1801/322

CIVIL DEFENSE

ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL DEFENSE SCHOOLS IN KUYBYSHEV OBLAST DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 11 Mar 83) p 12

[Article by Ya. Kurilin, head of the Kuybyshev Oblast department of public education, and Colonel A. Shevchenko, chief, Kuybyshev Oblast civil defense staff: "When a School is a Model School"]

[Text] The first model civil defense schools made their appearance in Kuybyshev Oblast four years ago. All rayons and cities in the oblast now have them. This redounds without question to the credit of the local public education authorities and civil defense staffs, which have successfully followed through with this fairly difficult task. For the fact is that it is no easy matter to raise a school to the level of a model school, that is, an exemplary standard school which can provide a point of reference for others, and transform it into a true training methods center and an energetic advocate and disseminator of the best and the latest in civil defense instructional methodology.

It should be pointed out that most of our rayon and city departments of public education have approached this important task with understanding. M. Dembo, L. Smirnova, I. Kosov and a number of other heads of rayon public education departments, for example, have involved themselves most directly in this effort. They have worked in close contact with CD staff and course personnel. V. Malygin, chief of the oblast department of public education's CD staff, and A. Starikov of the oblast CD staff have devoted a great deal of time and effort to the creation of these model schools.

One of the first, most important and urgent tasks was to provide the necessary training facilities, materials and equipment. In accomplishing this task, the schools drew upon support provided not only by local authorities and civil defense staffs, but by sponsoring enterprises and organizations as well. We must say that these sources were of great assistance. To help construct CD training grounds, for example, the sponsors of Kuybyshev's secondary general educational schools Nos. 54 and 116 allocated manpower, construction materials and equipment. A number of other enterprises joined in this effort as well.

It was to a great extent thanks precisely to this assistance provided by sponsors that civil defense training grounds and facilities soon appeared on the grounds of our model schools. Here were now a covered slit trench for 16 people, an open slit trench for 8-12 people and a radiation and chemical reconnaissance post. Plans also called for facilities for marking out trench locations, for readying instruments for operation and donning individual protective gear and for performing chemical and radioactive

decontamination operations. Rural schools have also been provided with wells protected against radioactive and toxic agents. In a word, as a result of what has been accomplished, students now have at their disposal everything they need for practical civil defense training and for satisfying norm requirements.

In addition to its training grounds, each of the oblast's model schools has a civil defense study center. The most important training aids here are display stands and interchangeable charts and posters prepared to accompany current programs of instruction. Beneath the stands are display cases containing organization equipment, models and other visual training aids. As a rule, these study centers are combined with the medical aid team training rooms.

Regardless of how much support they have received from sponsoring enterprises and organizations and civil defense staffs and courses, a great deal of the burden to be borne in creating these model schools has in fact been borne by the instructional personnel involved. To be a model school, that is, to represent a given set of standards, is not only a great honor, it is a great responsibility as well. Both the instructors and the directors are aware of this. They have consistently directed their efforts toward the objective of insuring that their schools stand as truly model schools, whether with regard to training facilities, equipment and materials or to the organization of the training routine.

Success in this effort has to a great extent depended upon the attitude of a school's director. For he, in fact, is responsible for both the training program and the accomplishment of all civil defense activities. It is therefore with special pleasure that we here name those directors to whom the model schools are to a great extent indebted for the results they have achieved. They include the following: V. German, V. Perepelkina, Ye. Gusev, G. Gavrilova, R. Sadreyev and a number of others.

We cannot here leave unmentioned the military instructors who voluntarily assumed the biggest share of the responsibility for insuring that the schools were provided with the proper training facilities, equipment and materials and who then subsequently came to serve as essentially outside consultants. We will find true enthusiasts here. They include V. Makushev, A. Shabolkin, A. Shekunov and N. Shitikov, all communists, all veterans of the Great Patriotic War. They not only themselves did much of the work involved in preparing and equipping the civil defense training grounds and study facilities, but enlisted the assistance of some of the older students as well. These volunteers have put together display stands, camouflaged slit trenches, put training grounds in order and done other chores for instructors.

Considering the fact that the model school is essentially a training methods center for a town or city, local departments of public education and CD staffs will plan and direct their activities and render them all assistance required. The model schools are already playing a very important role. They provide the setting for instructional methods sessions with directors, school instructional supervisors, military instructors, program teachers and 5th-grade classroom instructors.

Should all directors and chiefs of staff know that it is precisely here that they can receive the advice on preparing a CD plan, putting together the visual training aids they need and other questions associated with the planning, organization and conduct of local civil defense activities.

Teachers are also happy to come to the model schools for assistance not only during the annual training methods meetings put on by the civil defense course personnel, but at other times as well. Here they can undertake detailed study of methods to be employed in giving instruction on one topic or another, train in the proper execution of practical norms and get answers to difficult or obscure questions. Model schools also offer open-air, on-site instruction, demonstrations and instructional methods presentations for 2d- and 5th-grade teachers-

Take Kuybyshev Secondary School No. 116, for example, a school which is a training methods center not only for Zheleznodorozhnyy but for other rayons of Kuybyshev city and oblast. People come here for the experience in setting up training facilities and in organizing instructional methods activities.

The rayon department of public education plans the work of the model school together with the rayon CD staff. Participating in the work of drawing up these plans are M. Demko, head of the rayon department of public education, inspector V. Boyko, V. Bobyrev, chief of the rayon civil defense staff, V. German, the director of the school, and A. Shekunov, the military instructor.

Conferences for school directors, their deputies in charge of instruction and military instructors are also held at the schools. These occasions will see instructional methods presentations and seminars as well as outdoor instruction to deal with the most difficult questions. Military instructors, 2d-grade teachers and 5th-grade classroom instructors use these occasions as opportunities to exchange classroom experience. Demonstrations are organized using technical training aids to disseminate information on new and innovative practices. A. Shekunov, V. Dudakov, V. Makov and other military instructors have all conducted sessions like this.

Rayon civil defense course personnel participate actively in all these activities. The biggest share of the responsibility, however, naturally rests with the school's director and military instructor.

The creation of our model schools has not only helped improve instruction in the field of civil defense. It has also had a positive impact upon the whole process of training and educating the students. It is precisely in the model schools that we will see our civil defense instruction most organically combined with the educational process and integrated with the military-patriotic indoctrination of the pupils. They will devote a great deal of attention to the moral, political and psychological preparation of the pupils. Teachers are able to see for themselves that a practical orientation given to instruction, drills and competition has a positive impact on pupils, counteracts negative emotions and inspires confidence in the efficacy of CD measures. This effect will be all the greater the better pupils master the basics of civil defense.

New interesting experience gained in the course of giving instruction or putting on exercises, any of the Zarnitsa or Orlenok military sports games or Civil Defense Day activities will be of use above all to the instructors of our model schools. Most of them are now serving as laboratories for new and innovative experience and then as centers from which this experience is made available to all; they have entirely justified their designation.

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MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

REGULATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTES

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 6, Mar 83 (signed to press 1 Mar 83) p 47

[Answers to readers' questions: "The Military Schools Await You"]

[Text] The editors receive many letters asking for details on the regulations governing acceptance at military educational institutions for first-term and for career servicemen. Today, we are going to meet these requests.

In accordance with the existing statute, military educational institutions (VUZ) accept male persons from among the draftees, the civilian youth, soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers, who have a complete secondary education and have expressed a desire to become officers. They must have good moral and political qualities and efficiency, the state of their health must permit them to train in military educational institutions, they must meet the requirements for acceptance and must have passed the entrance exams.

First-term servicemen no older than 21 years have the right to enter military educational institutions of all services of the Armed Forces, branches of troops and services, regardless of their military specialty or their term of service. Career servicemen up to the age 23 years are entitled to enter the above military educational institutions after serving 2 years of extended service.

Seagoing and shore-based warrant officers no more than 23 years old may enter higher military educational institutions after serving 2 years in warrant officer or officer positions.

Servicemen desiring to enter educational institutions submit a request through the chain of command to the unit commander prior to 25 February. The serviceman's request indicates his rank, last name, first name and patronymic, the position he holds, the year and month of his birth, general and military education, as well as the name of the military educational institution (school, specialty) which he wishes to enter. He includes with the request, documents indicating his secondary education (copies of any certificates (attestat, svidel'stvo, udostovereniye) or diplomas), party or Komsomol references and three certified 4.5x6cm photographs taken without headgear.

First-term and career servicemen also include with the request, a brief history of their life, service references, record-of-service cards and copies of their

birth certificates. Reservists and civilian youth submit their applications to the rayon military commissariat where they live prior to 30 April of the year in which they desire to enroll at the military educational institution. The application contains the following information: last name, first name and patronymic of the applicant, the year and month of his birth, his residential address and the name of the military educational institution (school) where he wishes to enroll. He attaches to the application a brief history of his life, job or school references, party or Komsomol references, copies of documents indicating his secondary education (secondary school students submit a report indicating how well they are progressing at the time) and of his birth certificate, and three certified 4.5x6cm photographs taken without headgear.

The applicants submit their identification cards, their service records or draft registration slips and original documents indicating their secondary education and their birth certificates to the reception commission upon arrival at the military educational institution. Civilian youth (students) who are members of families of servicemen or employees of the Soviet Army stationed in the groups of forces submit their applications for admission to military educational institutions through the appropriate selection commissions for the groups of forces prior to 10 March of the year in which they wish to enroll at the military educational institution. The selection commissions report on the application of these individuals for acceptance at VUZs to the appropriate military commissariates at the locations where the individuals were registered before going abroad. The documents are filled out and these applicants are sent off to the VUZs by the commanders of the military units where the parents are serving or working.

For graduates of Suvorov military academies and Nakhimov naval academies and military music schools, the same documents are submitted to the VUZ selection commissions as are submitted for applicants from the civilian youth.

The documents for these individuals are sent to the higher military educational institutions by the chiefs of those academies (schools) by 1 June.

Servicemen who have previously applied for acceptance at military educational institutions but did not pass the entrance exams or were eliminated in the competition, may be accepted as candidates for training and permitted to take the entrance exams for subsequents, but no more than 3 times in all.

Reserving and shore-based warrant officers who have not made it through the competition for acceptance as full-time students may be accepted for correspondance study if there are openings for such at the given VUZ, without taking the entrance exams a second time, but only with the consent of the commanders of their military units.

The following are accepted at military educational institutions without taking the entrance exams:

- a. graduates of Suvorov military schools, at higher command schools (with four-year programs of study) and at higher military-political schools;

1. graduates of Nakhimov naval schools, at higher naval schools, the Kiev Higher Naval-Political School and the Naval Department of the Lvov Higher Political School;
2. individuals who have graduated from secondary schools or secondary specialized educational institutions with a gold or silver medal, those who have earned a diploma with excellence and graduates of Suvorov military schools and Nakhimov naval schools, at secondary military schools.

In addition, individuals who have successfully (with a grade of "good" or "excellent") completed the first or subsequent courses at civilian VUZs in the specialties corresponding to the field of training of the given military school and who meet the other requirements for acceptance at military educational institutions, may also be enrolled, after being interviewed by school officials, in the first year of study at higher and secondary military schools.

The following individuals are accepted at military educational institutions upon achieving good scores on the entrance exams, without participating in the competition:

1. individuals awarded orders and medals of the USSR for personal feats or for achieving good results in the combat and political training;
2. first-term servicemen and career personnel with excellent ratings for at least 1 year in the combat and political training, with a statement to that effect in an order from the military unit;
3. career personnel, for enrollment at secondary military schools.

For individuals scoring the same number of points on the tests, priority is given to the following for acceptance at military educational institutions:

1. seagoing and shore-based warrant officers with extensive practical experience in the service, with extensive service time in the specialty or field of the military educational institution to which they are applying for admission, as well as rated specialists from among the servicemen;
2. applicants sent for training under general Union Komsomol authorizations issued by the political sections of formations (military units), rayon and city Komsomol committees, and outstanding workers and kolkhoz workers;
3. graduates of specialized boarding schools with military-oriented training and graduates of military-patriotic youth schools at military schools;
4. individuals from among the civilian youth who have been awarded certificates of commendation after graduating from secondary school, who submit documents attesting to their active participation in school or other groups, in olympiads, competitions and reviews conducted by higher educational institutions and organizations, and who have performed best in the physical fitness testing for the USSR CTO [Ready for Work and Defense] standards.

Individuals who have graduated from secondary school with a medal or from a secondary specialized educational institution with distinction, take the entrance exams for acceptance at higher military schools in only one of the disciplines, which is announced no later than 1 month prior to the beginning of the entrance testing. If these individuals receive an "excellent" on the exam in the single discipline, they are exempted from taking the rest of the exams. Such individuals who receive "good" or "satisfactory" scores on the exams for the single discipline must also take the exams in the other disciplines.

Individuals entering military educational institutions take the competitive entrance exams covering the secondary school's program in mathematics (oral and written), physics (oral), Russian language and literature (a composition). Applicants from the civilian youth also take a physical fitness test corresponding to the USSR GTO system. Entrance exams are given from 15 July to 5 August.

In order to better prepare first-term servicemen and career personnel for the entrance exams and to accomplish this in a more organized manner, 30-day training assemblies are conducted for them in May-June of each year.

Military commissariats and unit commanders send applicants to take the entrance exams upon receiving notification from the chiefs of the schools. Applicants receive free transportation and free room and board after arriving at the school.

All graduates of military schools are issued a diploma of the standard, general Union format, attesting to their higher or secondary specialized military education, and a badge indicating that they have graduated from a military educational institution.

Detailed information on the acceptance regulations is available in the military commissariats and at the headquarters of military units.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

DIVERSIONARY-RECONNAISSANCE ACTIONS OF NATO ARMIES DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 83 (signed to press 24 Feb 83) pp 27-28

[Article based on material from the foreign press by Lieutenant Colonel M. Romanov: "The Platoon in Diversionary Actions, The NATO Armies: Organization, Weapons and Tactics"]

[Text] As can be seen from foreign military press reports, the NATO armies' small-subunit [podrazdeleniye] combat training program gives substantial attention to training in the area of diversionary, commando-type reconnaissance operations. Interest in this type of operation has grown even more intense ever since the US imperialists and their accomplices unleashed their undeclared war against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a war in which sabotage and plundering by bands of mercenaries are playing an increasingly predominating role.


As foreign observers point out, the organization and execution of these diversionary operations are rehearsed in the course of tactical exercises and maneuvers both on the scale of combined NATO-bloc armed forces and within the framework of the individual national armies, this training being most intense in the armies of the United States, Great Britain and the FRG. Formed to carry out these commando operations are special selected platoon-size diversionary-reconnaissance [commando] groups (DRG), these group comprising personnel from not only organic reconnaissance subunits, but from motorized infantry, infantry, air-mobile, airborne and marine subunits as well.

To a certain extent, the operational tactics and methods these commando groups employ are similar to those used in operations carried out by special forces subunits, who undertake their missions in support of companies, battalions, brigades as well as higher units and to great tactical depths. There will accordingly be organizational "trainer" instructors in US Army companies and battalions to instruct and train command group personnel. Specialists like this are also to be found in corresponding subunits of other NATO bloc armies.

Command groups will as a rule be armed with the organizational models of subunit weapons, that is, pistols, submachine guns, automatic and sniper rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, light antitank weapons (RPTR), PTUR [antitank guided rockets], 81-mm mortars and hand grenades and knives. And then, depending upon the nature of the missions they have been assigned, commando group personnel may also be armed with special models of noiseless, flashless small arms, explosives, incendiary and ignition devices and other weapons and means of sabotage.

All commando training for operations in the enemy rear is conducted in accordance with special manuals and instructions developed by NATO member armies and, as a rule, in the following sequence. A group will begin its preparations for a commando operation upon receipt of orders to undertake a specific combat mission, which is contained in the operational orders of the commander in support of whom the operation is to be carried out. As is emphasized in the manuals, these operational orders will be issued by this commander personally, in the process of which he gives the group leader a map and aerial photographs of the terrain in the vicinity of the objective which must be destroyed and passes on the necessary information concerning the disposition of his own as well as the enemy's forces in the group's zone of operation.

Upon receiving his combat assignment, the commando group leader immediately set about sizing up the situation; he carefully studies the terrain in the vicinity of the upcoming operation on the basis of the map and aerial photographs he has been provided and evaluates the situation at the point where they must cross the front line, on foot or by helicopter as the case may be, as well as on the approach to the objective of their operation. Only after this study will the group leader indicate the route over which the group will make its way into the enemy rear and outline the plan for its return after accomplishing its combat mission.



Key: 1 - start line; 2 - assault objective; 3 - platoon commander; 4 - observer; 5 - command trench; 6 - 1st advance detachment, assault subgroup; 7 - 2d advance detachment, combat support subgroup; 8 - 3d advance detachment, fire support subgroup; 9 - start line for machine-gun platoon of commando group; 10 - security patrol; 11 - assembly area.

At this point NATO manuals recommend that commandos take the most convenient and best concealed routes for movement across a front line and back and select clearly visible reference points on the terrain, landmarks which can be used during movement at night or under conditions of limited visibility. Equipment for commando group members is selected which, depending upon the situation and terrain conditions involved, would be of use in negotiating difficult terrain, particularly in mountainous areas, and in crossing water obstacles, marshes and so on.

Items of equipment most commonly packed will include rope, inflatable boats, skis and sled harnesses.

If it has not been decided upon beforehand, the size of the commando group is established immediately upon receipt of the operational order to undertake the particular mission. These groups will vary in size. Here we will be looking at a group the size of a US Army infantry platoon. This level of organization serves as the model for forming the groups and detachments sent from Pakistan into Afghanistan. According to foreign press reports, these groups are being instructed by specialists from the American, Israeli and other intelligence services.

A variant of the tactical operations undertaken by one of these groups is shown in the accompanying diagram above. The elements involved, the components, are called different things within the different NATO armies, but essentially they are all one and the same things. A commando group will as a rule have a command cell, or trench, and three teams (subgroups): an assault team, a combat support team and a fire support team. The command cell will consist of the commander, his deputy and one or two radio operators. The assault team (subgroup) may comprise as many as nine men. This team constitutes the central fighting core of the group. The combat support team consists of six men; its mission is primarily to cover the movement of the assault team. And, correspondingly, the role of the fire support team is to provide fire support for the commando group as a whole and may number (depending upon the type of crew-served weapon involved) five to seven men.

At a designated time and upon command or signal, the commando group moves under concealment to its initial position.

NATO army manuals recommend that a group send out combat security units (scouts) as it advances. During stops or halts the group commander will organize all-around observation. As the group approaches the objective to be destroyed, the combat support subgroup (team) will select and take up a position at a distance of 200-300 meters which is advantageous for observation and proceed to cover the movement of the entire group until it has crossed the danger zone.

If a commando group is to be landed in the enemy rear by helicopter, a number of commandos will first be dropped in the vicinity of the upcoming operation. The rest of the group will follow and be landed in the same place or nearby.

As can be seen from NATO manuals, the recommendation is that to knock out important objectives such as, for example, missile launch positions, headquarters, communication centers, depots and power plants, raids be carried out which can be planned and executed by several groups simultaneously under the covering fire of the support team.

As the group approaches the vicinity of the objective of its attack, the commander organizes all-around observation. Then after receiving more detailed information on the objective, group personnel take up their initial positions. First into position is the combat support team (subgroup), which surrounds, or "isolates", the objective. Then the fire support team (subgroup) moves to its assigned position. Last to take up its position, the assault team (subgroup) advances under concealment to its initial position led by the group commander. The objective to be destroyed is then attacked by surprise from a single or several directions.

NATO army manuals recommend that these commando operations be carried out at night and that commando groups carefully conceal themselves in difficult terrain by day. After completing their mission, the commandos return to their own positions by a different route or are taken out of enemy territory by helicopters, which land at a predesignated location.

The commands of the armies of the aggressive NATO bloc are working continually to improve the tactics and methods their commando groups will employ in operations under different climatic conditions. What is more, the whole system of training the soldiers of these subunits are put through is not only designed to develop their professional mastery of the latest in weapons and equipment, but also to cultivate in them an aggressiveness and readiness to fight for interests which are alien to themselves. A particular single-minded moral-political orientation is being developed in American soldiers, which is being achieved by subjecting them to a carefully designed system of brainwashing them in a spirit of hatred, even contempt, for other peoples, brutality and inhumanity. Let us recall how American soldiers conducted themselves in Vietnam and how they continue to behave in other countries today. Crime and violence in the streets of cities in the vicinity of American military bases have become everyday events. In a word, the moral configuration of the "GI", as the American soldier is referred to, has long since been firmly established. Corrupted by their "spiritual instructors", they are prepared to do anything. This imposes upon Soviet fighting men the duty of continually increasing their vigilance and maintaining themselves in a constant state of readiness to repel any aggressive action on the part of the NATO imperialists and their accomplices.

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